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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 Remote construction sites, such as oil production facilities and military forward 
operating bases, are often located in hostile areas that are vulnerable to the threat of 
explosive attacks. These attacks produce devastating and far-reaching consequences. 
From 2011-2015, explosive attacks targeting facilities and infrastructure resulted in 
more than 45,000 casualties and $73 billion in direct economic losses worldwide. 
Furthermore, the post-traumatic stress disorder rate among victims of explosive attacks 
is reported to be as high as 40%. To minimize the consequences of explosive attacks, 
site layout planners of remote construction sites utilize three primary protection 
measures that are designed to: (i) increase the standoff distances between site facilities 
and the potential location of an explosive device; (ii) construct perimeter walls to 
mitigate blast loads on facilities; and (iii) harden facilities to withstand blast loads. The 
integration of these protection measures increases construction costs and they can be 
challenging to implement when site space is limited. Accordingly, designers need to 
identify an optimum combination of these protection measures that minimizes the 
aforementioned explosive attack consequences while minimizing site construction 
costs.  
The main goal of this research study is to develop novel models for optimizing 
the planning of remote construction sites that provide the capability of minimizing facility 
destruction levels and consequences resulting from explosive attacks. To accomplish 
this goal, the research objectives of this study are to: (1) develop an innovative blast 
effects assessment model capable of efficiently quantifying and visualizing blast effects 
on facilities behind blast walls; (2) develop an original multi-objective facility protection 
 iii 
model for optimizing the site layout and selection of perimeter blast walls and building 
materials in order to minimize facility destruction levels from explosive attacks while 
minimizing site construction costs; and (3) develop a novel multi-objective optimization 
model for the layout and security planning of remote construction sites that provides the 
capability of simultaneously minimizing the consequences of an explosive attack and 
the construction costs of remote sites. 
The performance of the developed optimization models was analyzed using case 
studies of hypothetical remote construction sites. The results of analyzing these case 
studies illustrated the novel and distinctive capabilities of the developed models in 
enabling designers to search for and select optimum design configurations based on the 
mission of the remote construction site. These capabilities will result in the construction 
of cost-effective, secure sites that will reduce the risks to site personnel and facilities 
from the devastating effects of an explosive attack. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Problem Statement 
Remote construction sites are encountered in many projects such as oil 
exploration and production operations and the construction of remote military bases. 
With proven oil reserves in 101 countries (CIA 2015), oil exploration and production 
operations have increased 20% worldwide since 2000 (USEIA 2015) to accommodate 
the increasing demand for energy for the growing global population and the increased 
industrialization of developing countries. Similarly, the construction of remote military 
bases has increased in recent years to address heightened national security threats and 
confront conflicts worldwide. These construction projects are located in remote and 
often hostile areas. Project managers and planners of this type of construction are often 
confronted with a number of unique and critical challenges, including how to: (1) 
analyze and select blast walls and building materials to protect site facilities; (2) 
minimize the destruction of site facilities in the event of an explosive attack; and (3) 
mitigate the consequences of an explosive attack on site personnel, facilities, and 
operations. The following sections highlight the significance of these three pressing 
challenges confronting remote construction sites and the research needs to address 
them, as shown in Figure 1.1. 
 Blast Effect Assessment Challenges 
Explosive attacks on constructed facilities are a significant threat worldwide, 
producing devastating consequences including loss of life, property damages, and 
economic losses (Wu and Hao 2007; Dillon et al. 2009). In 2014 alone, explosive 
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attacks targeting facilities and infrastructure resulted in 8,024 casualties and $13.1 
billion in direct economic losses (Hunter and Perkins 2015; Institute for Economics and 
Peace 2015). In an effort to mitigate blast effects on facilities, it is necessary for 
designers to harden facilities and/or construct blast walls (Ward 2004; Remennikov and 
Rose 2007). Therefore, designers must carefully analyze and select the most effective 
combination of utilizing blast walls and hardening facilities to reduce the security risks to 
site personnel and facilities from the threat of an explosive attack (Carper 2011). 
A number of research studies were conducted to: (1) predict the impact of blast 
on facilities; and (2) analyze and quantify the effectiveness of blast walls in protecting 
facilities from an explosion. First, several models were developed to predict the impact 
of blast on facilities, employing empirical and numerical methods. Empirical methods 
are presented in several technical reports and design manuals (DoD 2002, 2008a; 
ASCE 2011) and integrated into the software system, ConWep (Kingery and Bulmash 
1984). Numerical methods include both (a) blast models that predict blast loads on 
facilities (McGlaun et al. 1990; Crepeau 1998; Britt et al. 1999; Nichols and Doyle 
2014); and (b) coupled analysis models (Hibbitt, Karlsson & Sorensen, Inc. 2004; Ansys 
2013; LSTC 2016) that are capable of accounting for structural motion as the blast 
calculation proceeds by combining both blast load and structural response calculations 
(Ngo et al. 2007). 
Second, a number of studies conducted live tests and used numerical methods 
to quantify the effectiveness of blast walls. Live tests were conducted on rigid steel walls 
(Beyer 1986; Jones et al. 1987; Chapman et al. 1995a; Rose et al. 1995, 1997), as well 
as non-rigid or frangible materials, including sand-filled containers, wood and ice walls 
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(Rose et al. 1998), concrete masonry units (CMUs) and thin precast concrete panels 
(Bogosian and Piepenburg 2002), full-size, soil-filled HESCO Bastion concertainers 
(Scherbatiuk and Rattanawangcharoen 2008), and water walls (Chen et al. 2015). 
Numerical method studies utilized computational fluid dynamics software packages to 
test and examine blast wall effectiveness (Chapman et al. 1995b; Ngo et al. 2004; 
Rickman et al. 2006). Numerical simulation data was also used to train artificial neural 
networks (Remennikov and Rose 2007; Bewick et al. 2011) and develop “pseudo-
analytical” formulae (Zhou and Hao 2008) that can be used with existing design 
manuals.  
Despite the significant contributions of the aforementioned research studies and 
blast models, they are incapable of: (1) efficiently predicting the performance of all 
feasible blast wall and building material design alternatives (Bogosian et al. 2002; 
Sorensen and McGill 2012); (2) quantifying the effectiveness of feasible blast wall types 
in reducing blast loads on facilities; and (3) visualizing the anticipated facility damage 
areas based upon blast charge weight, blast wall type, and building material 
combinations. Accordingly, there is an urgent need for a novel model that is capable of 
efficiently quantifying and visualizing blast effects on facilities behind blast walls of 
various materials in order to support designers in their critical task of identifying the 
most effective design for blast walls and facility hardening. 
 Facility Protection Challenges 
Remote construction sites such as oil production facilities and military forward 
operating bases are often located in remote and hostile areas that are vulnerable to the 
threat of explosive attacks that seek to destroy facilities and infrastructure (DoD 2008a, 
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2012; Johnson and Gilbert 2013). To minimize the destructive effects of these explosive 
attacks, planners of these remote construction sites need to incorporate a number of 
security measures including: (i) increasing the standoff distances between site facilities 
and the potential location of an explosive device; (ii) constructing perimeter walls to 
mitigate blast loads on facilities; and (iii) hardening facilities to withstand blast loads 
(Longinow and Mniszewski 1996; Remennikov and Rose 2007; DoD 2012). The 
integration of these site layout security measures increases construction costs; 
therefore, construction planners need to identify an optimum combination of these 
security measures that minimizes facility destruction while minimizing site construction 
costs (Stewart 2008).  
To address the aforementioned challenging site layout planning task, a number 
of research studies were conducted to assess and maximize the security of facilities 
and construction sites. These related research studies can be grouped in two categories 
that focused on: (1) improving the selection of security measures; and (2) optimizing site 
layout planning to improve the security of construction sites. The first category of related 
research studies focused on improving the selection of security measures. Grassie et al. 
(1990) proposed a six-step security measure selection process to assist designers in 
implementing a cost-effective approach to site security. Longinow and Mniszewski 
(1996) analyzed the interaction between air blasts and facilities in an effort to identify 
potential design changes and security guidelines that can minimize the damages and 
casualties caused by vehicle bombs. In another study, Little et al. (2002) proposed a 
decision framework for security and natural hazard risk mitigation that identifies the 
maximum level of damage to be tolerated for a facility based on its risk groups and 
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design event magnitudes. Dillon et al. (2009) developed an anti-terrorism risk-based 
decision aid to prioritize upgrade measures of existing facilities.  
The second group of related research studies focused on optimizing site layout 
planning to improve the security of construction sites. Khalafallah and El-Rayes (2008) 
utilized genetic algorithm to develop a multi-objective optimization model capable of 
simultaneously minimizing construction-related security breaches and minimizing site 
layout costs for airport expansion projects. Said and El-Rayes (2010) developed an 
automated multi-objective framework that minimizes site security risks from the threat of 
theft or destruction of classified materials while minimizing overall site costs. In two 
separate studies, Li et al. (2015a; b) utilized multi-objective, bi-level optimization 
algorithms to address the dynamic construction site layout and security planning 
problem.  
Despite the significant contributions of the aforementioned research studies, 
there is no reported research that focused on: (1) quantifying and minimizing the impact 
of potential explosive attacks on facilities; (2) optimizing the selection of blast walls and 
building materials to minimize blast damage levels on facilities; (3) generating optimal 
tradeoffs between the two critical site layout planning objectives of minimizing facility 
destruction levels from explosive attacks and minimizing site construction costs. 
Accordingly, there is a pressing need for a novel model that addresses these three key 
research areas and enables the optimization of the site layout of remote construction 
sites and their selection of perimeter blast walls and building materials to minimize both 
destruction levels and construction costs. 
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 Blast Consequence Mitigation Challenges 
The consequences of explosive attacks targeting remote construction sites can 
be grouped into four main categories: personnel loss, psychological impact, economic 
loss, and operational impact (FEMA 2011). The magnitude of these consequences has 
significantly increased in recent years. During a five-year period from 2011-2015, 
explosive attacks targeting facilities and infrastructure resulted in more than 45,000 
casualties and $73 billion in direct economic losses worldwide (Hunter and Perkins 
2015; Institute for Economics and Peace 2015; Perkins 2015). Furthermore, the post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) rate among victims of explosive attacks is reported to 
be as high as 40% (Neria et al. 2008).   
Designers and site layout planners of remote construction sites are confronted 
with two critical and challenging tasks in their efforts to construct resilient sites. First, 
they must be able to accurately and efficiently predict the potential consequences of 
explosive attacks. Second, they need to identify optimal combinations of site layouts 
and protection strategies that are capable of minimizing the consequences of an 
explosive attack while minimizing the construction costs of remote sites that have 
limited available site layout space. Research studies investigating these challenging 
tasks focused on three main areas: (1) evaluating the consequences of disasters and 
explosive attacks; (2) quantifying and aggregating explosive attack consequences; and 
(3) optimizing construction site layouts in order to maximize site security. These three 
research areas are briefly discussed below. 
The first area of research studies focused on evaluating the four main 
consequences of disasters and explosive attacks: personnel loss, psychological impact, 
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economic loss, and operational impact. Personnel loss studies examined the most 
frequent injury types suffered in explosive attacks, including severe head trauma, 
(Mellor 1992; Mallonee et al. 1996; Wightman and Gladish 2001), damage to the ears 
(Garth 1995; Cave et al. 2007), eyes (Abbotts et al. 2007; Morley et al. 2010), and lungs 
(Avidan et al. 2005; Sasser et al. 2006; Stuhmiller et al. 1996), as well as injuries from 
flying glass debris (Norville et al. 1999; Thompson et al. 2004; Ataei and Anderson 
2012). Psychological impact studies consist of applied epidemiological investigations on 
victims of a number of historical terrorist attacks, including the Oklahoma City bombing 
(North et al. 1999, 2002), September 11, 2001 attacks on New York City (Schuster et al. 
2001; Galea et al. 2002; Schlenger et al. 2002), 2004 Madrid train bombing (Gabriel et 
al. 2007; Vázquez et al. 2008), and French bombings of 1982-1987 (Abenhaim et al. 
1992) and 1995-1996 (Verger et al. 2004). Economic loss studies analyzed and 
differentiated between the macroeconomic (Blomberg et al. 2004; Enders and Olson 
2012) and microeconomic costs (Enders 2007), and between the direct (Dillon et al. 
2009) and indirect costs (Kazimi and Mackenzie 2016) of attacks. Operational impact 
studies investigated facility downtime caused by disasters (Comerio 2000; Pachakis and 
Kiremidjian 2004; Comerio 2006; Bailey and Levitan 2008; Porter and Ramer 2012) and 
methods of determining facility importance to a site mission (Karydas and Gifun 2006; 
Antelman et al. 2008; Grussing et al. 2010).   
The second group of research studies developed frameworks to quantify and 
aggregate the consequences of disasters and explosive attacks. For example, Ayyub et 
al. (2007) and McGill et al. (2007) created quantitative methods for performing critical 
asset risk analysis based upon five consequence types: casualty, economic, mission 
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disruption, environmental damage, and recuperation time. These studies provided a 
methodology to aggregate the five consequences into a single measure of monetary 
loss. Dillon et al. (2009) utilized multi-attribute utility theory to integrate owner value 
preferences between the mission, personnel, and economic consequences of terrorist 
attacks. The third area of research studies consists of the aforementioned site layout 
optimizing models designed to maximize construction site security. 
Despite the significant contributions of the aforementioned research studies, 
existing risk analysis and layout-based security optimization models are incapable of: 
(1) efficiently quantifying the consequences of explosive attacks because they rely on 
the use of time-consuming external blast analysis software packages; (2) evaluating the 
impact of serious and minor injuries on total personnel losses; (3) quantifying the extent 
of psychological impacts on survivors of explosive attacks; (4) measuring the impact of 
explosive attacks on the operational capacity of the site in terms of the total number of 
days the site is unable to perform its primary mission; and (5) generating a set of 
optimal combinations of site layout solutions and protection strategies that provide 
optimal tradeoffs between minimizing the consequences of explosive attacks and 
minimizing site construction costs. Accordingly, there is an urgent need for the 
development of a novel optimization model that is designed to overcome the above five 
limitations of existing models. 
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Figure 1.1 Challenges and Research Needs in Remote Construction Sites 
1.2 Research Objectives 
The primary goal of this research study is to develop novel models for optimizing 
the planning of remote construction sites that provide the capability of minimizing facility 
destruction levels and consequences resulting from explosive attacks. To accomplish 
this goal, the objectives of this research study along with its research questions and 
hypotheses are summarized below: 
Objective 1:   
Conduct a comprehensive literature review on the latest research in: (1) 
quantifying blast effects on facilities behind blast walls; (2) quantifying the 
consequences that explosive attacks and disasters inflict on site personnel and 
facilities; (3) analyzing models and best practices developed for remote construction site 
security planning; (4) modeling and optimizing the layout of construction sites; and (5) 
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investigating multi-objective optimization techniques that are capable of addressing the 
unique challenges of remote construction sites. 
Research Questions:  
(a) What methods are available to predict blast impacts on facilities? (b) What 
impact do feasible rigid and frangible blast walls have in reducing blast loads on remote 
facilities? (c) What are the primary consequences inflicted on site personnel and 
facilities in the event of an explosive attack? (d) What methods are available to quantify 
the various consequences of explosive attacks? (e) What design decisions and security 
measures can be selected to reduce the consequences of these threats? (f) What 
methods exist to optimize the selection of numerous facility locations on a remote 
construction site? and (g) What decision-making and optimization techniques are 
available to model the unique challenges presented in this research?  
Objective 2: 
Develop an innovative blast effects assessment model that is capable of 
efficiently quantifying and visualizing blast effects on facilities behind blast walls of 
various materials in order to support designers in their critical task of identifying the 
most effective design for blast walls and facility hardening. 
Research Questions: 
(a) What are the feasible blast wall types that can be constructed to reduce blast 
loading on facilities? (b) How do blast wall type, building material, and facility 
location affect the expected damages to a facility in the event of an explosive 
attack? and (c) How can visualizations of the anticipated facility damage 
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areas based upon blast charge weight, blast wall type, and building material 
be generated to enable the performance of visual risk management 
assessments of the design scenario?  
Hypothesis:  
A blast effects assessment model for remote construction sites can provide the 
capability of quantifying and visualizing blast effects on facilities behind blast walls of 
various materials.  
Objective 3: 
Develop an original multi-objective facility protection model for optimizing the site 
layout and selection of perimeter blast walls and building materials in order to minimize 
facility destruction levels from explosive attacks while minimizing site construction costs. 
Research Questions: 
(a) What metrics can be utilized to quantify the destruction of site facilities? (b) 
What modeling techniques are available to represent the site area and location of 
multiple site facilities? and (c) Which optimization techniques can be utilized to generate 
optimal tradeoffs between minimizing facility destruction levels from explosive attacks 
and minimizing site construction costs?  
Hypothesis:  
A multi-objective facility protection optimization model for remote construction 
sites can be used to analyze and optimize tradeoffs between minimizing site facility 
destruction levels and minimizing total site construction cost. 
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Objective 4: 
Develop a novel multi-objective optimization model for the layout and security 
planning of remote construction sites that provides the capability of minimizing the 
consequences of an explosive attack and minimizing the construction costs of remote 
sites. 
Research Questions: 
(a) What metrics can be used to quantify the consequences of explosive attacks 
inflicted on site personnel, facility assets, and the site’s ability to conduct operations? (b) 
How can the extent of serious injuries and minor injuries be computed? (c) How can the 
psychological impacts experienced by explosive attack survivors be defined and 
quantified? and (d) How can the various consequence metrics that have inherently 
different units of measure be aggregated to model the overall explosive attack 
consequences on remote construction sites?  
Hypothesis:  
A blast consequence mitigation model can be used to generate and analyze 
optimal tradeoffs between minimizing the consequences of an explosive attack and 
minimizing the construction costs of remote construction sites. 
1.3 Research Methodology 
This section outlines the proposed methodology for achieving the objectives of 
this research study. As shown in Figure 1.2, the proposed methodology can be divided 
into four major tasks: (1) conduct a comprehensive literature review; (2) develop a blast 
effects assessment model for remote construction site facilities; (3) create a facility 
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protection optimization model for remote construction sites; and (4) develop a blast 
consequence mitigation model for remote construction sites.    
 Task 1: Conduct a Comprehensive Literature Review 
This task will focus on conducting a comprehensive literature review to identify 
and investigate the latest research focusing on remote construction site challenges. The 
work in this research task can be subdivided into the following subtasks:  
Task 1.1: Evaluate methods for quantifying blast effects on remote facilities behind blast 
walls 
The objective of this task is to investigate available blast assessment methods for 
quantifying blast effects on remote facilities. Furthermore, this task examines feasible 
blast walls that can be constructed to reduce blast loading on facilities in hostile and 
remote locations. Blast walls may be rigid, such as steel or reinforced concrete, or 
frangible, such as sand-filled, water-filled, and wood walls.  
Task 1.2: Analyze the consequences of explosive attacks on remote construction sites 
The purpose of this task is to analyze the consequences of explosive attacks on 
remote construction sites. These consequences include fatalities, serious injuries, and 
minor injuries suffered by site personnel, psychological impacts inflicted on survivors of 
an explosive attack, direct and indirect economic losses, and degradation of operational 
or mission capability. Additionally, this task investigates methods to aggregate 
consequences that have inherently different units of measure into a single consequence 
score. 
Task 1.3: Examine construction site security planning models and best practices 
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This research task analyzes available security planning models and best 
practices for the design and construction of remote sites. The areas investigated include 
criteria for selecting security countermeasures, blast mitigation techniques, and 
methods to prioritize anti-terrorism upgrade decisions. 
Task 1.4: Study the latest research on construction site layout models 
The purpose of this task is to review available methodologies for modeling 
construction site layout planning including heuristics and genetic algorithms. 
Furthermore, this task will review how each of these methodologies handles the 
required constraints of construction site layouts including boundary, overlap, and zone 
conditions.  
Task 1.5: Analyze available multi-objective optimization techniques 
This task focuses on analyzing available multi-objective optimization techniques 
that can be used in addressing the unique challenges of remote construction sites. The 
reviewed multi-objective optimization techniques in this task can be grouped in three 
main categories: (1) weighted linear and integer programming; (2) genetic algorithms; 
(3) and nature-inspired metaheuristic algorithms.  
 Task 2: Develop a Blast Effects Assessment Model  
The purpose of this task is to develop a blast effects assessment model capable 
of efficiently quantifying and visualizing blast effects on constructed facilities behind 
blast walls. The model is intended to support designers in their critical task of analyzing 
and comparing all feasible design alternatives in order to select the most effective 
combination of blast wall type and building material to reduce the security risks to site 
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personnel and facilities from the threat of an explosive attack. The work in this research 
task can be subdivided into the following tasks:  
Task 2.1: Develop a frangible wall effectiveness metric 
In this task, a new metric will be developed to quantify the performance of 
feasible frangible wall types including sand-filled, water-filled, and wood walls in 
reducing peak reflected pressure and impulse loading on facilities. Development of this 
metric includes novel analytical formulae and a set of frangible blast wall effectiveness 
factors for pressure and impulse.  
Task 2.2: Formulate a blast effects assessment model 
Formulate a blast effects assessment model to compute an overall facility 
damage level for constructed facilities behind blast walls. This model will consider 
design combinations of blast wall type, building material, and facility location for a 
specified blast charge weight. The model will also generate visualizations that display 
anticipated facility damage areas based upon blast charge weight, blast wall type, and 
building material combinations.  
Task 2.3: Implement the blast effects assessment model 
Implement the developed blast effects assessment model utilizing the Python 
programming language (Rossum 1995) and the 2-D plotting library matplotlib (Hunter 
2007). 
Task 2.4: Confirm model performance and evaluate model performance using a case 
study  
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First, the accuracy and efficiency of the blast effects assessment model will be 
confirmed by comparing it to an existing blast damage assessment tool. Next, the model 
performance will be evaluated, refined, and improved using a case study of a remote 
construction site. 
 Task 3: Develop a Facility Protection Optimization Model  
This task will focus on developing a multi-objective facility protection optimization 
model capable of quantifying and minimizing facility destruction levels from explosive 
attacks while minimizing site construction costs. The model is intended to equip 
planners of remote construction sites with the capability to efficiently analyze and 
compare all feasible design alternatives in order to construct remote sites that minimize 
the destruction levels of site facilities from the threat of explosive attacks in the most 
cost-effective manner. The work in this research task can be subdivided into the 
following subtasks:  
Task 3.1: Formulate a facility protection optimization model 
The purpose of this task is to formulate a multi-objective facility protection 
optimization model for remote construction sites that is capable of generating optimal 
tradeoffs between minimizing site facility destruction levels from an explosive attack and 
minimizing the total site construction cost. 
Task 3.2: Identify site layout geometric constraints 
The objective of this task is to identify all practical geometric constraints that can 
be encountered in the planning of remote construction sites, including: (1) site 
boundary; (2) facility overlap; (3) minimum distance; and (4) maximum distance. 
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Task 3.3: Implement the facility protection optimization model 
This task focuses on implementing the developed facility protection optimization 
model using multi-objective genetic algorithms.   
Task 3.4: Evaluate model performance using a case study  
This task evaluates, refines, and improves the performance of the developed 
facility protection optimization model by analyzing a case study of a hypothetical remote 
construction site.   
 Task 4: Develop a Blast Consequence Mitigation Model 
The objective of this task is to develop a multi-objective blast consequence 
mitigation model capable of quantifying and minimizing the consequences of an 
explosive attack and minimizing the construction costs of remote sites. The model is 
intended to support designers in their critical task of searching for and identifying 
optimal remote construction site layouts in order to construct remote sites that minimize 
the personnel loss, psychological impact, economic loss, and operational impact in the 
event of an explosive attack while minimizing site construction costs. The work in this 
research task is organized in the following subtasks:  
Task 4.1: Identify explosive attack consequence metrics 
In this task, new metrics will be developed to quantify the consequences of 
explosive attacks on remote construction sites. These metrics include personnel loss, 
psychological impact, economic loss, and operational impact.   
Task 4.2: Formulate a blast consequence mitigation model 
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Formulate a multi-objective blast consequence mitigation model that is capable 
of generating optimal tradeoffs between minimizing the consequences of an explosive 
attack and minimizing the construction costs of remote sites. 
Task 4.3: Implement the blast consequence mitigation model  
Implement the developed blast consequence mitigation model using the NSGA-2 
genetic algorithm (Deb et al. 2002).   
Task 4.4: Evaluate model performance using a case study 
Evaluate and refine the performance of the developed blast consequence 
mitigation model using a case study of a hypothetical remote construction site. 
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Figure 1.2: Research Methodology 
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1.4 Research Significance 
The developments of this research study are expected to have significant and 
broad impacts on: (1) quantifying and visualizing blast effects on facilities behind 
frangible blast walls; (2) minimizing facility destruction levels; and (3) mitigating the 
consequences of explosive attacks on remote construction sites.    
1. Quantifying and visualizing blast effects on facilities behind frangible blast walls  
This research study holds a strong potential to improve blast wall and facility 
design at remote construction sites by developing a model that allows designers to 
efficiently and accurately analyze and compare the performance of all feasible frangible 
blast wall types in reducing blast loading on facilities. Furthermore, the model generates 
visualizations of the anticipated facility damage levels based upon the selected design. 
These generated visualizations will enable designers to rapidly perform visual risk 
management assessments of their design scenarios and determine if any design 
changes are needed to provide the required level of protection for constructed facilities.  
2. Minimizing facility destruction levels  
The present study is expected to support site layout planners of multi-facility 
remote construction sites in minimizing facility destruction levels from explosive attacks. 
The proposed multi-objective optimization model is designed to generate a broad 
spectrum of Pareto-optimal solutions that represent unique and optimal tradeoffs 
between the two optimization objectives of minimizing site facility destruction levels and 
minimizing site construction costs. Accordingly, site layout planners can select the 
design from the spectrum of Pareto-optimal solutions that best fit the maximum 
acceptable level of destruction based on the mission of the remote construction site or 
  
 
21 
complies with the maximum available budget. This capability will result in the 
construction of cost-effective, high-performance sites that will lower the risks to facilities 
from the devastating effects of an explosive attack. 
3. Mitigating explosive attack consequences 
The developed blast consequence mitigation model provides site layout planners 
with the capability of minimizing explosive attack consequences in remote construction 
sites while keeping site construction costs to a minimum. The model provides much-
needed support for designers and enables them to identify an optimal and cost-effective 
site layout that minimizes security risks in remote construction sites. This can lead to 
numerous and significant improvements in the performance of this type of project, 
including minimized risks of personnel fatalities and injuries, fewer diagnoses of post-
traumatic stress disorder among explosive attack survivors, reduced economic losses 
from damage to facilities, and fewer disruptions to the overall mission of the site.  
1.5 Report Organization 
The organization of this report and its relation with research objectives, tasks and 
deliverables is described as follows: 
Chapter 2 presents a comprehensive literature review that establishes baseline 
knowledge of the latest research in: (1) quantifying blast effects on facilities behind blast 
walls; (2) evaluating and aggregating the consequences of explosive attacks on remote 
construction sites; (3) analyzing existing models and best practices for improving 
construction site security; (4) modeling and optimizing construction site layouts; and (5) 
investigating available decision-making and multi-objective optimization techniques that 
are capable of addressing the unique challenges of remote construction sites. 
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Chapter 3 discusses the development of a novel blast effects assessment model 
capable of efficiently quantifying and visualizing blast effects on constructed facilities 
behind blast walls. This chapter presents the model in five main stages: (1) blast wall 
analysis stage that develops a novel analytical formula and a set of effectiveness 
factors to quantify the performance of feasible frangible blast wall types including sand-
filled, water-filled, and wood walls in reducing peak reflected pressure loading on 
facilities; (2) facility damage assessment stage that computes the percent area of each 
facility within five specified damage levels in order to calculate an overall facility damage 
level; (3) blast damage visualization stage that displays anticipated facility damage 
areas based upon blast charge weight, blast wall type, and building material 
combinations; (4) model validation stage that confirms the accuracy and efficiency of 
the developed model; and (5) performance evaluation stage that analyzes the 
performance of the developed model using a case study. 
Chapter 4 displays the development of a multi-objective model for optimizing the 
site layout and selection of perimeter blast walls and building materials in order to 
minimize facility destruction levels from explosive attacks while minimizing site 
construction costs. This chapter presents the model in three main stages: (1) 
formulation stage that defines the relevant decision variables, formulates the objective 
functions, and identifies practical model constraints; (2) implementation stage that 
performs the optimization computations using multi-objective genetic algorithm; and (3) 
performance evaluation stage that analyzes an application example to evaluate and 
improve model performance.  
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Chapter 5 presents the development of a novel multi-objective optimization 
model for the layout and security planning of remote construction sites that provides the 
capability of minimizing the consequences of an explosive attack and minimizing the 
construction costs of remote sites. This chapter presents the developed model in three 
main stages: (1) consequence identification stage that quantifies the consequences of 
explosive attacks targeting facilities; (2) formulation stage that identifies the relevant 
decision variables, formulates the objective functions, and defines all practical 
constraints; and (3) implementation stage that performs the optimization computations 
using genetic algorithm and specifies the model input and output data. The performance 
of the developed model is then analyzed using a case study that is designed to illustrate 
the use of the model and demonstrate its unique capabilities.  
Chapter 6 presents the conclusions, research contributions, and recommended 
future research of the present study. 
  
  
 
24 
  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
A comprehensive literature review has been conducted to establish a firm 
foundation for the proposed study. The literature review focused on investigating and 
analyzing the current practices as well as relevant research studies in the security 
planning of remote construction sites. This chapter summarizes and organizes the 
reviewed literature in five main sections: (1) quantifying blast effects on facilities behind 
blast walls; (2) quantifying the consequences of explosive attacks and disasters on 
facilities; (3) security planning for remote construction sites; (4) construction site layout 
modeling; and (5) decision-making and optimization techniques.  
2.2 Quantifying Blast Effects on Facilities behind Blast Walls  
Explosive attacks on constructed facilities are a significant threat worldwide, 
producing devastating consequences including loss of life, property damages, and 
economic losses (Wu and Hao 2007; Dillon et al. 2009). In 2014 alone, explosive 
attacks targeting facilities and infrastructure resulted in 8,024 casualties and $13.1 
billion in direct economic losses (Hunter and Perkins 2015; Institute for Economics and 
Peace 2015). Designers attempt to minimize blast effects on facilities by maximizing the 
standoff distance between the facility and the likely location of an explosive device, 
hardening facilities, and/or constructing blast walls to mitigate potential blast effects 
(Longinow and Mniszewski 1996; Ward 2004; Remennikov and Rose 2007; DoD 2012). 
In order to analyze and select the most effective design combination of utilizing blast 
walls and hardening facilities to reduce security risks to site personnel from the threat of 
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an explosive attack, designers must have accurate methods to quantify blast impacts on 
facilities behind blast walls. This section discusses a number of studies that were 
conducted to: (1) predict the impact of blast on facilities; and (2) analyze and quantify 
the effectiveness of blast walls in protecting facilities from an explosion. 
 Blast Assessment Methods  
Several models were developed to predict the impact of blast on facilities, 
employing empirical and numerical methods. Empirical methods provide best-fit design 
curves of experimental data (Goel and Matsagar 2014). These methods consolidated 
and incorporated extensive experimental blast data into several technical reports and 
design manuals, including American Society of Civil Engineers Structural Engineering 
Institute (ASCE/SEI) 59-11 (ASCE 2011), Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 3-340-01 
(DoD 2002), which superseded Technical Manual (TM) 5-855-1 (USACE 1984), and 
UFC 3-340-02 (DoD 2008a), which superseded TM 5-1300 (U.S. Dept. of the Army 
1990). The equations and design curves presented by Kingery and Bulmash (1984) 
form the basis of the UFCs above and have also been incorporated into a software 
system named ConWep (Hyde 1988), which is capable of modeling and calculating 
blast loads on constructed facilities (Stewart and Netherton 2015). Numerical methods 
typically utilize computational fluid dynamics to solve mathematical equations of the 
laws of physics governing the problem such as the conservation of mass, momentum, 
and energy (Remennikov 2003). Numerical methods can be subdivided into: (a) blast 
models that predict blast loads on facilities; and (b) coupled analysis models, which are 
capable of accounting for structural motion as the blast calculation proceeds by 
combining both blast load and structural response calculations (Ngo et al. 2007). 
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Examples of blast models are BlastX (Britt et al. 1999), CTH (McGlaun et al. 1990), 
ProSAIR (ProSAir 2009), SHAMRC (Crepeau 1998) and VAPO (Nichols and Doyle 
2014). Coupled analysis models include ABAQUS (Hibbitt, Karlsson & Sorensen, Inc. 
2004), AUTODYN (Ansys 2013) and LS-DYNA (LSTC 2016).  
 Blast Walls  
A blast wall is a physical barrier that separates valuable facilities from explosive 
threats (Smith 2010), as shown in Figure 2.1. Blast walls function by reflecting a portion 
of the explosive blast energy, thereby reducing peak reflected pressure loading on the 
facility (Remennikov and Rose 2007). A number of studies conducted live tests and 
used numerical methods to quantify the effectiveness of blast walls. This section will 
discuss these experimental methods for both rigid and frangible blast walls.  
 
Figure 2.1 Blast Wall Configuration (Bewick et al. 2011) 
2.2.2.1 Live Tests 
Beyer et al. (1986) and Jones et al. (1987) conducted two of the earliest studies 
on rigid blast walls. Both studies recorded reflected pressure-time history 
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measurements behind rigid steel walls to quantify the blast parameters behind a vertical 
wall and the subsequent reduction in blast loads on a facility. Beyer et al. (Beyer 1986) 
performed tests on a 1/6th scale, vertical cantilever wall constructed of steel armor plate. 
The authors tested combinations of three blast charge weights (1, 8, and 15 pounds of 
spherical C4) and three blast wall designs. Jones et al. (1987) simulated vehicle-borne 
improvised explosive device (VBIED) attacks on a facility by conducting live tests on 
1/10th scale models of a rigid steel wall. Appropriately scaled charges, representing the 
most probable security threats faced by designers, were detonated at various standoff 
distances from the model facility.  
In response to frequent VBIED attacks on facilities in Northern Ireland, 
researchers from Cranfield University at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom 
conducted a series of live test experiments on rigid steel walls. Rose et al. (1995) 
performed 1/10th scale tests on a plane, non-deforming steel wall. Pressure-time 
histories were measured in a grid of locations behind the wall and results were 
presented as contour plots of peak pressure and scaled impulse at increments of “wall 
heights” from the wall. This study demonstrated that a plane, non-deforming steel wall 
significantly reduces the pressure and impulse behind a wall out to approximately six 
wall heights.  
Seeking to expand the work conducted by Rose et al. (1995), Chapman et al. 
(1995a) performed experiments on steel walls to quantify the impact that considering 
additional design parameters, namely the distance from the blast to the blast wall, would 
have on altering blast loads on facilities behind blast walls. The authors were able to 
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develop a “protection factor” based upon the resulting pressure-time history contour 
plots as functions of the geometric parameters shown in Figure 2.2.  
 
Figure 2.2 Geometrical Parameters Included in a “Protection Factor” (Chapman et 
al. 1995a) 
Several design charts from the work of Chapman et al. (1995a) were published in 
Rose et al. (1997). The design charts plotted peak overpressure (kPa) and peak scaled 
impulse (kPa ms/kg1/3) versus scaled distance (standoff distance/blast charge weight1/3) 
at various heights on the protected facility for selected ratios of distance from the blast 
to the wall and distance from the wall to the protected facility. It is worth noting that the 
results of these scale model experiments correlated well with the full-scale experiments 
conducted by Hulton et al. (1995), thereby validating the scale model approach to blast 
wall experiments.  
Live tests were also conducted on blast walls constructed of non-rigid or frangible 
materials. Rose et al. (1998) concluded the Cranfield University blast wall research 
stream by performing a series of 1/10th scale tests on seven different materials (sand-
filled containers, balsa wood, polystyrene, polythene, revetting fabric, water-filled and 
ice walls) in 23 experimental configurations. The different configurations served to 
compare variations in wall geometry, height, thickness, and stabilization method. The 
tests were conducted by detonating a 57g spherical charge of Demex explosive 
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(equivalent to 75g TNT) at a distance of 138mm from the wall and a height of 109mm 
above the ground. Peak pressure and peak scaled impulse measurements were 
recorded at four distances between 1.35 and 1.8m behind the wall. The results of the 
study showed that frangible materials provide comparable and often greater reductions 
in blast loading than rigid walls.  
Bogosian and Piepenburg (2002) performed a series of 35 live tests, analyzing 
the effectiveness of rigid concrete walls as well as four frangible wall types: concrete 
masonry units (CMUs), thin precast concrete panels, thin water, and thick water. The 
authors developed a frangible wall effectiveness factor (EF), which is defined as the 
ratio of the pressure or impulse behind a frangible blast wall divided by the same metric 
behind a rigid blast wall, as shown in Eqs (2.1)-(2.2). Each test series measured EFp 
values at several scaled heights on the building. In order to create a more useable 
metric, a single EFp value was calculated for each frangible wall type by consolidating 
and averaging the effectiveness factors over all building elevations. Experimental 
results showed that all four frangible wall types performed better than the rigid concrete 
wall with regard to mitigation of pressure. For mitigation of impulse, the CMU, thin 
precast concrete panels, and thick water walls performed better than the rigid concrete 
wall, while the thin water wall performed worse than the rigid concrete wall.  
 
𝐸𝐹𝑃 =
𝑃𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒  
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑑 
 (2.1) 
 
𝐸𝐹𝐼 =
𝐼𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒  
𝐼𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑑 
 (2.2) 
where,  
𝐸𝐹𝑃   = frangible wall effectiveness factor for pressure; 
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𝑃𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒  = blast pressure behind a frangible wall (kPa);  
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑑    = blast pressure behind a rigid wall (kPa); 
𝐸𝐹𝐼   = frangible wall effectiveness factor for impulse;  
𝐼𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒  = blast impulse behind a frangible wall (kPa-ms); and 
𝐼𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑑    = blast impulse behind a rigid wall (kPa-ms). 
Two recent research efforts have performed live tests with numerical simulations. 
The purpose of the live tests was to calibrate the developed numerical models, which 
could then be used to run additional simulations without the inherent expense or safety 
concerns associated with live tests. Scherbatiuk and Rattanawangcharoen (2008) 
executed three full-size tests on soil-filled HESCO Bastion concertainers, a 
prefabricated unit, made of galvanized welded steel mesh lined with non-woven 
polypropylene geotextile. Chen et al. (2015) performed nine in-situ experiments on 
scale-size water walls in an explosion chamber. Both research studies utilized LS-
DYNA (LSTC 2016) to develop their numerical simulations. Scherbatiuk and 
Rattanawangcharoen (2008) developed a finite element model capable of predicting 
displacement-time histories of soil-filled concertainers subjected to blast loading. Chen 
et al. (2015) utilized their numerical simulation to derive empirical formulae capable of 
predicting the blast environment behind water walls.  
2.2.2.2 Numerical Methods 
Numerical methods were also used to quantify the effectiveness of blast walls. 
For example, Chapman et al. (1995b) utilized AUTODYN2D (Ansys 2013) to analyze 
the simulation of blast waves over protective barriers. The authors recorded high 
correlation between the simulation data and the experimental results from Rose et al. 
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(1995). This work demonstrated that numerical simulation methods can accurately 
simulate blast wave and blast wall interactions in both simple and complex geometries 
in two dimensions.  
Ngo et al. (2004) used LS-DYNA (LSTC 2016) and Air3D (2001) to produce 
three-dimensional visualizations of the complex flow of a blast wave propagating over a 
wall. Their study aimed to visualize the effectiveness of blast walls for a range of 
standoff distances, wall heights, and geometries.  
Rickman et al. (2006) conducted a series of small-scale experiments and 
employed SHAMRC simulations (Crepeau 1998) to examine the effect of wall height, 
charge-to-wall distances, and charge-to-facility standoff distances on the shielding 
capability of blast walls. Their analysis yielded four main conclusions. First, all barriers, 
even relatively short ones, can significantly reduce the peak reflected pressures on 
facilities behind the wall. Second, blast walls may provide significant protection for 
facilities that are taller than the walls themselves. Third, blast walls can still provide 
significant protection for facilities at relatively large wall-to-facility distances. Fourth, the 
primary source of protection provided by blast walls is likely from the slowing of the air 
shock wave as it diffracts over the blast wall toward a facility. 
As the quality of numerical simulations matured and the capability of blast walls 
to significantly reduce blast loads on facilities was confirmed, the emphasis of research 
studies shifted to quantifying blast wall effectiveness based upon individual design 
scenarios. The focus was on developing adjustment factors capable of quantifying the 
reduction in peak reflected pressure and peak impulse on facilities behind blast walls. 
The earliest paper to introduce this concept was Rose et al. (1995), with the 
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development of pressure and improvement benefit factors. The remaining papers in this 
section used various methods to quantify blast wall adjustment factors based upon a 
number of input factors.  
Remennikov and Rose (2007) and Bewick et al. (2011) utilized both test data 
from live scaled experiments and numerical simulation data to train artificial neural 
networks (ANNs) to predict the area of effectiveness behind a blast wall and 
subsequent blast loads on structures. The purpose of the research was to develop 
stand-alone, fast-running tools capable of quantifying pressure and impulse adjustment 
factors based upon blast charge weight, blast wall height, wall-to-facility distance, 
charge-to-facility distance, and height on the building. The pressure and impulse 
adjustment factors are defined as the ratio of reflected pressure or impulse behind a 
blast wall to the original pressure or impulse when no wall is present, as shown in Eqs. 
(2.3)-(2.4). For example, a pressure adjustment factor of 0.4 represents a 60% 
reduction in pressure behind a wall compared to a no-wall configuration. The advantage 
of using ANNs to predict blast wall adjustment factors is the ability to obtain accurate 
results in significantly less time than methods requiring complex numerical 
computational fluid dynamics (CFD) simulations. The disadvantages of using ANNs to 
predict blast wall adjustment factors is acquiring the amount of validated test data that is 
needed to train the ANN. Further, while extremely capable, these ANNs still do not 
realize the level of flexibility that exists with numerical CFD simulations.  
 
𝐴𝐹𝑃 =
𝑃𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙  
𝑃𝑛𝑜 𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙
 (2.3) 
 
𝐴𝐹𝐼 =
𝐼𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙  
𝐼𝑛𝑜 𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙
 (2.4) 
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where,  
𝐴𝐹𝑃   = pressure adjustment factor for a blast wall; 
𝑃𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙   = blast pressure behind a wall (kPa);  
𝑃𝑛𝑜 𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙   = blast pressure with no wall (kPa); 
𝐴𝐹𝐼   = impulse adjustment factor for a blast wall;  
𝐼𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙   = blast impulse behind a wall (kPa-ms); and 
𝐼𝑛𝑜 𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙   = blast impulse behind a rigid barrier (kPa-ms). 
Zhou and Hao (2008) developed “pseudo-analytical” formulae to estimate the 
reflected pressure-time histories on a facility behind a blast wall. These formulae were 
developed as best-fit curves of AUTODYN3D numerical simulations (Ansys 2013). They 
are expressed in terms of the following parameters: blast charge weight (W), distance 
from the explosion to the facility (D), facility height (HB), the height of the gauge point on 
the facility (He), blast wall height (H1), and the ratio of the distance between the blast 
wall and the explosion to that between the facility and the explosion (L1/D), as shown in 
Figure 2.3. The formulae can be combined with existing design manuals, such as UFC 
3-340-02 (DoD 2008a), to predict blast loading on facilities behind a rigid wall. 
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Figure 2.3 Problem Configuration (Zhou and Hao 2008) 
 Limitations of Available Blast Models and Blast Wall Research Studies 
Despite the significant contributions of the aforementioned research studies and 
blast models, they are incapable of: (1) efficiently predicting the performance of all 
feasible blast wall and building material design alternatives due to the significant 
computational time and effort required by numerical blast assessment models to 
analyze each possible combination of blast wall type, building material, and facility 
location (Bogosian et al. 2002; Sorensen and McGill 2012); (2) quantifying the 
effectiveness of feasible frangible blast wall types including sand-filled, water-filled, and 
wood walls in reducing peak reflected pressure loading on facilities; and (3) visualizing 
the anticipated facility damage areas based upon blast charge weight, blast wall type, 
and building material combinations. Accordingly, there is an urgent need for a novel 
model that is capable of efficiently quantifying and visualizing blast effects on facilities 
behind blast walls of various materials in order to support designers in their critical task 
of identifying the most effective design for blast walls and facility hardening. 
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2.3 Quantifying Consequences of Explosive Attacks and Disasters 
Explosive attacks targeting remote construction sites, such as oil production 
facilities and military forward operating bases, cause devastating consequences. The 
magnitude of these consequences has significantly increased in recent years. During a 
five-year period from 2011-2015, explosive attacks targeting facilities and infrastructure 
resulted in more than 45,000 casualties and $73 billion in direct economic losses 
worldwide (Hunter and Perkins 2015; Institute for Economics and Peace 2015; Perkins 
2015). Furthermore, the post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) rate among victims of 
explosive attacks is reported to be as high as 40% (Neria et al. 2008). The Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) groups explosive attack consequences into 
four primary categories: personnel loss, psychological impact, economic loss, and 
operational impact (FEMA 2011). The following sections present the most relevant and 
recent research on these consequences as well as methodologies to aggregate various 
consequence types into a single combined consequence value. 
 Personnel Loss 
Personnel loss measures the extent of fatalities, serious injuries, and minor 
injuries suffered by victims of explosive attacks. Trauma from explosives is traditionally 
divided into three groups: primary, secondary, and tertiary injuries.  
Primary blast injuries occur when the force of the blast overpressure or shock 
wave causes direct tissue damage (Wolf et al. 2009). Explosive tests indicate that 
human blast tolerance varies by both the magnitude of the shock wave and the shock 
duration, i.e. the pressure tolerance for short-duration blast loads is significantly higher 
than that for long-duration blast loads. For example, for a short-duration blast of 3-5 ms, 
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50 percent of personnel are expected to suffer eardrum rupture, lung damage, and 
lethality at 15 psi, 80 psi, and 130-180 psi, respectively (DoD 2008a).  
Secondary blast injuries occur when a person is struck by debris that is displaced 
by the blast overpressure or winds, such as glass, ball bearings, nails and rocks. This 
flying debris causes a combination of penetrating and blunt trauma. Because debris 
fragments can travel much greater distances than the blast shock wave, secondary 
injuries are more frequent than primary injuries and can occur in individuals hundreds to 
thousands of meters from the explosion’s epicenter (Wolf et al. 2009).  
Tertiary blast injuries are caused when a person is physically displaced by the 
force of the blast shock wave and strikes an object. Examples of tertiary injuries include 
blunt head trauma, blunt abdominal trauma, tissue contusions, and fractures. 
Furthermore, the risk of tertiary injuries is exacerbated by the collapse of buildings or 
surrounding structures. Consequently, tertiary injuries result in the highest level of 
mortality among blast victims (Wolf et al. 2009). 
Researchers have performed epidemiological studies to examine the causes and 
extent of the most prevalent injury types, including severe head trauma, (Mellor 1992; 
Mallonee et al. 1996; Wightman and Gladish 2001), damage to the ears (Garth 1995; 
Cave et al. 2007), eyes (Abbotts et al. 2007; Morley et al. 2010), and lungs (Stuhmiller 
et al. 1996; Avidan et al. 2005; Sasser et al. 2006), as well as injuries from flying glass 
debris (Norville et al. 1999; Thompson et al. 2004; Ataei and Anderson 2012). 
 Psychological Impact 
Psychological impact measures the frequency and severity of emotional and 
psychological disorders among survivors of explosive attacks. The psychological 
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impacts of explosive attacks encompass a range of emotional, behavioral, and cognitive 
reactions including: (1) distress responses, such as insomnia and increased feelings of 
anxiety or anger; (2) behavioral changes, like avoiding air travel or increasing alcohol 
consumption; and (3) psychiatric illnesses, such as post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) or clinical depression (Butler et al. 2003). The majority of psychological impact 
studies focused on analyzing the causes, frequency, and severity of PTSD because it is 
the best-defined and one of the most frequent and debilitating psychological disorders 
experienced in the aftermath of explosive attacks (Gabriel et al. 2007; Neria et al. 2008). 
Researchers have conducted applied epidemiological studies on victims of a 
number of historical terrorist attacks, including the Oklahoma City bombing (North et al. 
1999, 2002), September 11, 2001 attacks on New York City (Schuster et al. 2001; 
Galea et al. 2002; Schlenger et al. 2002), 2004 Madrid train bombing (Gabriel et al. 
2007; Vázquez et al. 2008), and French bombings of 1982-1987 (Abenhaim et al. 1992) 
and 1995-1996 (Verger et al. 2004). These studies show that injured survivors, 
uninjured survivors, first responders, and residents of the local area around an attack 
frequently experience symptoms of PTSD. Furthermore, injured survivors of explosive 
attacks experience the highest reported rates of PTSD, normally ranging from 30-40%, 
while 10-20% of first responders suffer PTSD, and 5-10% of uninjured survivors and 
local residents are inflicted with PTSD. 
 Economic Loss 
Economic loss measures the total financial cost inflicted on a site by an attack 
and is the sum of direct losses and indirect losses. Direct losses include all damage to 
fixed assets, capital, inventories, raw materials, and spare parts. Indirect losses 
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represent the flow of goods that will not be produced and services that will not be 
provided by the damaged facility (Pelling et al. 2002). Indirect losses can far exceed the 
direct losses of an explosive attack (Kazimi and Mackenzie 2016). Examples of indirect 
loss include increased unemployment, decreased property values, reduction in travel 
and tourism, and reduction in foreign direct investment and trade (Enders and Olson 
2012; Rose 2009).  
Studies have analyzed and differentiated between the macroeconomic 
(Blomberg et al. 2004; Enders and Olson 2012) and microeconomic costs (Enders 
2007), and between the direct (Dillon et al. 2009) and indirect costs (Kazimi and 
Mackenzie 2016) of attacks. Furthermore, researchers have developed frameworks that 
integrate a site’s economic resilience and behavioral linkages in estimating total losses 
from an attack (Rose 2009; Rose and Blomberg 2010). 
 Operational Impact 
Operational impact measures the level of mission degradation on a site resulting 
from the downtime of critical facilities damaged by a disaster or explosive attack. 
Mission degradation is a function of the downtime of a damaged facility and the 
importance of a facility to the overall site mission. 
Several studies have investigated the downtime of damaged facilities following 
disasters, such as earthquakes (Comerio 2000; Pachakis and Kiremidjian 2004; Porter 
and Ramer 2012), damaging snow loads (Strobel and Liel 2013), and hurricanes (Bailey 
and Levitan 2008). Two of the most significant studies regarding facility downtime are 
Comerio (2006) and Comerio and Belcher (2010). Comerio 2006 estimates facility 
downtime following a disaster by considering both rational and irrational components. 
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Rational components include the construction cost to repair the damaged facility and 
the time needed for construction. Irrational components are situationally specific and 
include the time needed to secure financing and mobilize for repairs, and the availability 
of qualified workers to perform the repairs. The author then presented a simplified 
method for estimating facility downtime based upon total facility area and facility 
damage level. Building on this study, Comerio and Belcher (2010) analyzed the impact 
of several other factors on facility downtime, including facility area, number of units, and 
facility height. The authors found no statistical significance that any of these factors had 
a significant impact on facility downtime. The authors concluded that modeling facility 
downtime requires the incorporation of three critical elements: (1) an estimate of 
construction repair time for the damaged facility; (2) an estimate of project mobilization 
time; and (3) a representation of the economic conditions within the region at the time of 
the event.  
Two primary methods have been developed to calculate the importance of 
individual facilities to the overall site mission. The first method was developed to 
prioritize infrastructure projects at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Karydas 
and Gifun 2006). The model utilizes multi-attribute utility theory and the analytical 
hierarchy process to prioritize facilities based on 16 criteria, including minimization of 
risk, optimization of economic impact, and coordination with applicable policies, 
programs, and operations. The second method was developed to determine 
infrastructure criticality for the United States Navy (Antelman et al. 2008). This method 
has since been adopted and tailored to meet the specific programming needs of the 
other branches of the United States Department of Defense, including the United States 
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Army (Grussing et al. 2010). Antelman et al. (2008) developed the scoring methodology 
for a facility’s mission dependency index (MDI), which represents the percentage that 
the overall site operations will be degraded if the facility is unable to perform its primary 
function. MDI is calculated by assigning scores from a scoring matrix based upon 
designers’ answers to questions designed to assess the: (a) length of time a facility can 
be inoperable before having an adverse impact on the site mission; (b) ability of another 
facility to perform the mission of the damaged facility; and (c) difficulty to replace the 
services provided by the damaged facility. MDI is measured on a normalized scale of 
0% to 100%, with 100% representing facilities the highest risk to the site mission. 
 Consequence Aggregation Models 
Several research studies have developed frameworks to quantify and aggregate 
the consequences of disasters and explosive attacks. For example, Ayyub et al. (2007) 
and McGill et al. (2007) created quantitative methods for performing critical asset risk 
analysis based upon five consequence types: casualty, economic, mission disruption, 
environmental damage, and recuperation time. To calculate these five consequence 
types, McGill et al. (2007) recommended using system modeling techniques and subject 
matter experts to estimate consequences, while Ayyub et al. (2007) assumes the 
severity of consequences follows a normal distribution within three pre-defined damage 
levels. Both studies utilized conversion factors to aggregate the five consequences into 
a single measure of monetary loss; however, their methodology to calculate these 
consequences for a specific threat was reported to be limited by Dillon et al. (2009) due 
to its inability to consider the risk tolerance levels of owners and designers. To address 
this reported limitation, Dillon et al. (Dillon et al. 2009) utilized multi-attribute utility 
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theory to calculate a single consequence score as the weighted sum of mission, 
personnel, and economic impacts, where weights represent the importance of each 
consequence type to site owners and the shape of utility curves reflects owner risk 
tolerance.  
 Limitations of Available Disaster Consequence Quantification Models 
Despite the significant contributions of the aforementioned consequence 
quantification models, they are incapable of: (1) efficiently quantifying the consequences 
of explosive attacks because they rely on the use of time-consuming external blast 
analysis software packages; (2) evaluating the impact of serious and minor injuries on 
total personnel losses; (3) quantifying the extent of psychological impacts on survivors 
of explosive attacks; and (4) measuring the impact of explosive attacks on the 
operational capacity of the site in terms of the total number of days the site is unable to 
perform its primary mission. Accordingly, there is an urgent need for the development of 
a novel model that is designed to overcome these four limitations of existing models.  
2.4 Security Planning for Remote Construction Sites 
A number of security planning models have been developed to assist designers 
in selecting security measures and procedures to minimize the risks from threats faced 
on remote construction sites. This section highlights the most relevant and recently 
developed heuristics and optimization-based security models.   
 Heuristics Security Models 
Grassie et al. (1990) proposed a six-step structured countermeasures selection 
process to assist design engineers in implementing a cost-effective approach to site 
security. The six steps are: (1) identify all assets to be protected; (2) determine asset 
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criticality; (3) identify potential threats; (4) ascertain likely modes of attack; (5) determine 
asset vulnerability based upon attack severity; and (6) select protection required when 
considering financial and operational constraints. The design team then concentrates on 
developing asset, facility and site-specific countermeasures that are physical, electronic, 
operational, or procedural in nature. Countermeasures are then selected based upon 
their cost effectiveness, which considers the operational impact, vulnerability reduction, 
and the cost of operation including installation, lifecycle operations and maintenance, 
and savings in security manpower over the life of the system.  
Longinow and Mniszewski (1996) analyzed the interaction between air blasts and 
building structures in an effort to identify potential design changes and security 
guidelines that could be followed to minimize the damages and casualties caused by 
vehicle bombs. Using the bombings of the World Trade Center (1992) and the Alfred P. 
Murrah Federal Building (1995) as case studies, the authors investigated vehicle bomb 
damage and casualty mechanisms, building structural systems that are capable of 
resisting progressive collapse, and nonstructural building components and building 
systems that are able to reduce secondary damages such as those caused by flying 
debris. They concluded that it is impractical to either design conventional buildings to 
withstand the effects of a close-in blast or to retrofit existing buildings against blast.  
Rather, the authors stated that a strong perimeter fence at a sufficient distance from the 
building provides the greatest defense. Six design guidelines were provided to establish 
the recommended perimeter including providing the maximum possible standoff 
distance, creating redundancy in protection measures, and constructing a robust, well-lit 
fence, capable of completely denying or sufficiently delaying unauthorized site access.   
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Hicks et al. (1999) utilized Cost and Performance Analysis (CPA), which is the 
integration of Activity Based Cost (ABC) estimating and performance-based analysis, to 
evaluate physical protection systems effectiveness. Cost estimation was performed with 
Cost Analysis Tool for Security Systems (CATSS), a tool that is built around Automated 
Cost Estimating Integrated Tools (ACEIT), an existing Department of Defense tool that 
supports a full lifecycle cost analysis, from procurement to decommissioning. 
Performance analysis was completed via PERFORM, which is the integration of two 
existing tools, Analytic System and Software for Evaluating Safeguards and Security 
(ASSESS), a Department of Energy software designed to assess the performance of 
physical protection systems of nuclear assets, and Joint Tactical Simulation (JTS).  
System effectiveness is defined as the probability of interruption, P(I), multiplied by the 
probability of neutralization, P(N) for each attacker and response combination. P(I) is a 
function of detection probabilities and delay times of the attackers and the response 
time of security personnel. The overall model objective is to compare the costs of 
physical protection system components with probabilistic methods of performance in 
order to facilitate operational and strategic management decisions.    
Little et al. (2002) proposed a simplistic decision framework for security and 
natural hazard risk mitigation. The decision framework identifies the maximum level of 
damage to be tolerated for a facility based on its risk groups and design event 
magnitudes. The maximum level of damage to be tolerated can be mild, moderate, high 
or severe, as shown in Table 2.1. Based upon the identified tolerable level of damage, 
decision makers recommend the required upgrade measures for the facility. For 
example, a small, unoccupied storage facility that is not critical to a site’s operations 
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may be assigned into risk group I, which represents buildings that require lower levels of 
protection. If the threat assessment and risk analysis identifies a high probability of a 
very large event, such as a 5,000-pound vehicle bomb, the chart shows that a severe 
amount of damage could be tolerated on the storage facility. Conversely, a critical 
facility assigned to risk group IV would only be able to tolerate moderate levels of 
damage in a very large event. Depending on the risk group and anticipated design 
event magnitude in this example, upgrade measures would need to be identified and 
constructed in order for the risk group IV category building to only experience moderate 
levels of expected damage.  
Table 2.1 Maximum Level of Damage to be Tolerated Based on Risk Groups and 
 Design Event Magnitudes (adapted from Little et al. 2002) 
  RISK GROUPS 
INCREASING LEVEL OF RISK 
 
  Risk Group I 
(Prot. Level 
Low) 
Risk Group II 
(Prot. Level 
Medium/Low) 
Risk Group III 
(Prot. Level 
Medium) 
Risk Group IV 
(Prot. Level 
Higher) 
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VERY LARGE 
(Very Rare) 
(Higher Risk) 
SEVERE SEVERE HIGH MODERATE 
LARGE 
(Rare) 
(Medium Risk) 
SEVERE HIGH MODERATE MILD 
MEDIUM 
(Less Frequent) 
(Med/Low Risk) 
HIGH MODERATE MILD MILD 
SMALL 
(Frequent) 
(Low Risk) 
MODERATE MILD MILD MILD 
 
Dillon et al. (2009) developed an anti-terrorism risk-based decision aid (ARDA) to 
prioritize anti-terrorism upgrade measures of existing facilities. The framework 
considered 15 potential attack modes, from hostage situations to chemical warfare 
agent attacks, and 160 existing facility types. Total potential consequences of an attack 
were calculated as the weighted sum of mission impact, personnel loss, and economic 
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loss. Weights are defined through project managers’ utilization of the multi-attribute 
utility theory. Upgrade decisions are then made based upon a reduction in risk versus 
cost ratio. While this model does provide a standardized and organized method by 
which to prioritize upgrade measures of existing facilities, it does not consider the cost 
investment for mitigation alternatives. Additionally, this model cannot be directly applied 
to new construction.   
 Security Optimization Models 
Khalafallah and El-Rayes (2008) investigated the security risks associated with 
the planning of airport expansion projects. The authors developed a multi-objective 
optimization model capable of simultaneously minimizing construction-related security 
breaches and minimizing site layout costs, while complying with all Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) guidelines. Security decision variables included security response 
distances and physical security measures. The physical security measures include both 
FAA-required items such as physical barriers (e.g. fences) and access control systems 
(e.g. keypad entry and fingerprint scan) and three FAA-recommended items: (1) anti-
intrusion systems such as CCTV and motion detectors; (2) detection technologies such 
as x-ray scanning and explosives detection; and (3) security lighting systems. Using a 
weighted-average approach, the authors combined two criterions, Security Response 
Distance Criterion (SRDC) and Security Systems Criterion (SSC) into a combined 
Construction-Related Security Level (CRSL). Costs are a product of the security 
systems and the travel costs of resources, which are based on the following three 
factors: (1) planned travel frequency of crews; (2) crew hourly cost rate; and (3) average 
speed of travel (El-Rayes and Khalafallah 2005). The model only considers security 
  
 
46 
breaches from an aggressor reaching a targeted facility. It does not consider explosive 
threats at the site perimeter.  
Said and El-Rayes (2010) developed an automated multi-objective optimization 
framework that provides the capability to: (1) minimize site security risks; and (2) 
minimize overall site costs. The security threat analyzed in this model was the threat of 
theft or destruction of classified materials in the targeted facility, a Sensitive 
Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF). The model utilized the Crime Prevention 
through Environmental Design (CPTED) theory (Crowe 2000), relying on a combination 
of natural surveillance, target hardening and lighting to deter criminal acts. The 
considered countermeasures consisted of security lighting, fencing, intrusion detection 
systems, security guard response forces, and natural surveillance. The site consisted of 
three layers: (1) site fence; (2) site grounds; and (3) target fence, and the model 
considered both security and layout decision variables over multiple phases of 
construction. Facilities were characterized as fixed, moveable or stationary, which for 
practical purposes, are considered fixed due to the excessive cost of relocation (e.g. 
cranes). Costs included security system costs and layout costs (resource travel costs 
and facility relocation costs over the phases of construction). The probability and 
consequence of a potential attack was a product of the attacker intrusion speed and 
response time of security personnel. Attacker intrusion speed considered delays from all 
site security countermeasures including the delay inflicted by the site fence, site 
grounds, target fence, and target buffer (distance between target fence and targeted 
facility). The security system effectiveness was calculated based on the probability of 
interruption, a deterrence index, and the probability of detaining the attacker. Site 
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security risks were limited to an individual reaching one targeted facility. There was no 
consideration of the risk of explosive. As a result, the choice of building materials or 
facility hardening was not considered.   
Li et al. (2015a) utilized a multi-objective, bi-level Particle Swarm Optimization 
Algorithm (MOBLPSO), to address security planning in a dynamic construction site 
layout scenario. The proposed scenario is bi-level as the project manager and attacker 
are involved in a Stackelberg game (Simaan and Cruz Jr 1973). The upper-level 
programming is based on the decisions of the project manager in seeking two 
objectives: (1) minimize the efficiency consequence of a facility system, measured by 
the reduction in operational efficiency of a facility following an attack; and (2) minimize 
the site layout cost, security system cost, and economic consequences of a potential 
attack. To quantify economic and efficiency consequences, the model employed twofold 
random uncertainty, that is, the use of random variables with random parameters. The 
lower-level programming denotes the decision of the attacker, who will attempt to 
destroy a subset of facilities that will result in the greatest economic consequences.  As 
a result, the model can consider potential attackers’ strategies.  
 Limitations of Available Security Models 
Despite the significant contributions of the aforementioned security models, there 
is no reported research that focused on: (1) minimizing the consequences of explosive 
terrorist attacks on remote construction sites; and (2) generating a set of optimal 
combinations of site layout solutions and protection strategies that provide optimal 
tradeoffs between minimizing the consequences of explosive attacks and minimizing 
site construction costs. Accordingly, there is a pressing need for a novel multi-objective 
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blast consequence mitigation model for remote construction sites that is capable of 
overcoming these limitations of existing models.  
2.5 Construction Site Layout Planning Models 
The primary purpose of site layout planning is to allocate site space to resources 
so that they can be accessible and functional during construction (Zouein and 
Tommelein 1999). Optimizing site layouts can assist in achieving multiple objectives 
such as minimizing resource transportation and facility relocation costs (Zouein and 
Tommelein 1999; Mawdesley et al. 2002; Tam et al. 2002), improving site safety 
(Elbeltagi et al. 2004; El-Rayes and Khalafallah 2005), and minimizing site security risks 
(Khalafallah and El-Rayes 2008; Said and El-Rayes 2010; Li et al. 2015a). Site layout 
models can also be static (one phase) or dynamic (multiple phases of construction). The 
following sections discuss several methodologies used in the literature to accomplish 
site layout planning tasks. 
 Heuristics 
Zouein and Tommelein (1999) approached the problem of dynamic site layout 
planning with a combination of constraint satisfaction, heuristics, and linear 
programming. The model objective is to minimize total cost, which is the sum of 
transportation and relocation costs. Resources are represented as rectangles in a two-
dimensional space. The facility centroid, its dimensions, and its orientation identify the 
location of each facility. A series of hard constraints determine which positions are 
acceptable and soft constraints gauge the quality of the layout. Resources are analyzed 
one at a time and a position is selected for each resource based upon two heuristics: (1) 
resources with the largest relocation weights; and (2) resources with the greatest 
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interaction with other positioned resources. Tiebreaker heuristics are also identified, if 
required. A linear program is then used to minimize overall costs. The main limitation of 
the system is that layouts are selected chronologically, meaning earlier optimized 
layouts cannot be reanalyzed. As a result, the system cannot achieve global optimality.   
Tam et al. (2002) analyzed a site layout-planning problem using nonstructural 
fuzzy decision support system (NSFDSS). NSDFSS consists of three steps: (1) 
decomposition, which is breaking the problem down in a hierarchal fashion; (2) 
conducting pairwise comparisons on a three-point scale (better, the same, or worse); 
and (3) synthesis of priorities that combines decision criteria with weighting factors.  The 
authors claim that their method offers three advantages over the traditional analytical 
hierarchy process (AHP): (1) a simplified comparative rating scale (1, 0.5, and 0) in 
evaluating the relative importance of decision criteria; (2) built-in consistency checking 
by placing a greater level of reliability on higher rows and automatically resetting the 
values of lower rows if inconsistencies are found; and (3) elimination of consistency 
deviation by providing absolute consistency during evaluation. The data is then 
arranged in matrix form to display comparison and score assignment. Project managers 
can then use the priorities identified by the NSFDSS to aid in decision making. The 
authors reported two main limitations in this model: (1) decisions and comparisons are 
still not automated although the process is less labor intensive than AHP; and (2) quality 
of results is highly dependent on the knowledge and expertise of the project 
management team.    
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  Genetic Algorithms 
Mawdesley et al. (2002) utilized an augmented genetic algorithm to model the 
cost to move and position temporary facilities on a construction site over time. A user-
defined grid system was established to create potential locations within site boundaries.  
Facilities are assumed to be rectangular and are represented by coordinates of two 
opposite corners. The model allows for user-defined minimum and maximum interfacility 
distances. There are three sources of costs considered in this model: (1) the cost to 
setup a facility; (2) the cost to remove a facility; and (3) the cost of transporting 
materials between locations. Minimum travel distances can be calculated using either 
Manhattan (follows only axis-aligned directions) or Euclidean (straight line between two 
points) geometry. Additionally, the model allows for varying site conditions and can 
account for unequal transportation costs in north-south, south-north, east-west, and 
west-east directions. The authors identify two primary limitations of their model: (1) its 
sensitivity to the relative costs assigned to facility setup and material transport; and (2) 
modeling the dynamic nature of a project by considering the site layout to be correlated 
with the work phases.  
Elbeltagi et al. (2004) developed a GA that was able to consider the effects of 
safety in dynamic layout planning. The model aimed to minimize distances between 
facilities for the purpose reducing resource travel costs, but only to the extent that it did 
not move facilities into unsafe zones around high-risk buildings. The authors adapted 
existing closeness relationships from Malakooti (1987) and introduced large negative 
values when safety concerns arose between two facilities. The model was built into 
Excel using macros, which allowed for linking to widely used scheduling software.  
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Furthermore, model results can be exported to Geographical Information System (GIS) 
to automate site mapping.   
While many other studies have investigated the optimization of construction site 
layout planning, considering security of critical infrastructure projects as an objective 
has been limited to only a few studies, namely Khalafallah and El-Rayes (2008) and 
Said and El-Rayes (2010). The main limitation of these studies is that they only consider 
the security risk of human breaches, not the risk of explosive attacks. As both of these 
papers were discussed in section 2.4.2 above, the discussion of these papers in this 
section will focus on their facility layout component.  
Khalafallah and El-Rayes (2008) developed a multi-objective genetic algorithm 
capable of minimizing construction-related security breaches while keeping the site 
layout costs of airport expansion projects to a minimum. The location of temporary 
facilities such as security fences, site offices and hazardous material storage facilities 
affect numerous aspects of this model including: (1) the response distances required by 
security personnel; (2) the buffer zone sizes between secure areas and temporary 
facilities; and (3) the travel costs of resources. The travel costs of resources are 
estimated based on the planned travel frequency of crews, the crew hourly cost rate, 
and the average speed of travel (El-Rayes and Khalafallah 2005). In order to perform 
the optimization, project planners must provide the dimensions of each temporary 
facility, the available options for temporary fence placement, the location and dimension 
of each secure facility on the construction site and the recommended security response 
distances between secure areas. The output of the model includes identifying the 
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optimal location of temporary facilities and the security fence and the optimal utilization 
of security control systems in order to achieve the aforementioned objectives.  
Said and El-Rayes (2010) developed an automated multi-objective optimization 
framework, using genetic algorithm, to simultaneously minimize the site security risks 
and minimize the overall site costs associated with the construction of critical 
infrastructure projects. The main security threat in this model was the theft or 
destruction of classified materials located in a Sensitive Compartmented Facility (SCIF). 
The construction site was separated into three layers: (1) site fence; (2) site grounds; 
and (3) target fence. Additionally, multiple phases of construction were considered, 
potentially requiring the relocation of temporary facilities and construction materials. The 
model is designed to dynamically position all temporary facilities and relocate moveable 
facilities in each stage of the project. Facility location impacts the length of an attacker’s 
intrusion path (which impacts the likelihood of a successful attack), the degree or 
amount of natural surveillance, and site layout costs, which are the sum of resource 
travel costs and facilities relocation costs. Analogous to Zouein and Tommelein (1999), 
the facilities are represented by their centroid, dimensions and orientation. Four types of 
geometric constraints must be satisfied in order to successfully place a facility within the 
site boundary: 1) boundary; 2) overlap; 3) distance; and 4) zone constraints (El-Rayes 
and Said 2009). The model generates an optimal combination of security measures and 
facility positions over multiple phases of construction to minimize site security risks and 
to minimize overall site costs.  
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2.6 Multi-objective Optimization Techniques for Remote Construction 
Sites 
This section presents a number of available multi-objective optimization 
techniques for addressing the unique challenges of remote construction sites, including: 
(1) weighted linear and integer programming; (2) nature-inspired metaheuristic 
algorithms; and (3) genetic algorithms.  
 Weighted Linear and Integer Programming 
A multi-objective optimization problem can be transformed into a scalar problem 
by using the weighted-sum method in the form, minimize:  
 
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑖(?̅?)
𝑘
𝑖=1
 
(2.5) 
where,  
k  = number of objective functions; 
𝑓𝑖(?̅?)  = scalar objective functions; and 
wi  = weighting coefficients representing the relative importance of the 
objectives. 
In this method, it is generally assumed that all weighting coefficients are positive 
and the sum of the coefficients equal one (Coello 1999). The two main advantages of 
this method over other optimization techniques are: (1) the ability to achieve a global 
optimum solution, as opposed to the sub-optimal solutions reached when using 
metaheuristic optimization methods, and (2) faster computational efficiency. The main 
disadvantage is the difficulty in determining the appropriate weighting coefficients when 
little is known about the problem or how the relative weights will affect the solution 
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(Coello 1999). To overcome this shortcoming, it is necessary to solve the same problem 
for many different values of 𝑤𝑖  in order to generate the Pareto front (Caramia and 
Dell’Olmo 2008). This approach is simple and effective when solving problems with a 
convex Pareto front (Figure 2.4); however, if the problem is non-convex, there is a set of 
points that cannot be achieved for any combination of the weighting coefficients (Figure 
2.5). 
 
Figure 2.4 Weighted-sum Approach with Convex Pareto Curve (Caramia and 
Dell’Olmo 2008)  
 
 
Figure 2.5 Weighted-sum Approach with Non-convex Pareto Curve (Caramia and 
Dell’Olmo 2008)  
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The weighted-sum method can be employed in linear, integer or mixed-integer 
programming problems. A main limitation to linear programming is the requirement for 
all objective functions and constraints to be linear. Integer programming refers to 
decision variables that are non-continuous and non-fractions such as the number of 
personnel required to complete a task. Mixed-integer programming is when some 
decision variables require integers and others are continuous (Abdallah 2014). These 
techniques have been used to solve many complex optimization problems in 
construction, including facility layout modeling (Foulds et al. 1998; Kim and Kim 2000). 
 Nature-inspired Metaheuristic Algorithms 
Hard optimization problems can be defined as problems that cannot be solved by 
any deterministic method within a reasonable amount of time (Boussaïd et al. 2013). 
Metaheuristics can be used to solve these hard optimization problems. Metaheuristics 
are “higher-level” heuristics, meaning that they are designed to approximately solve a 
wide range of optimization problems without having to deeply adapt to each specific 
scenario (Boussaïd et al. 2013). Most metaheuristic algorithms are nature-inspired, 
seeking optimality by mimicking some physical, biological or ethological process. In a 
recent survey, Fister Jr. et al. (2013), identified more than 40 nature-inspired 
metaheuristic algorithms based upon such natural processes as migratory bird patterns 
(Eberhart and Kennedy 1995), ant colony behaviors (Dorigo et al. 1996), bacterial 
foraging (Chu et al. 2008), firefly bioluminescence (Yang 2009), slime mold life cycle 
(Monismith and Mayfield 2008), cockroach infestation (Havens et al. 2008), mosquito 
host-seeking (Feng et al. 2009), and bat echolocation (Yang 2010). This section will 
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analyze the two most prevalent nature-inspired metaheuristic algorithms: particle swarm 
optimization and ant colony optimization.  
2.6.2.1 Particle Swarm Optimization  
Particle swarm optimization (PSO) is a population-based, stochastic optimization 
technique, inspired by the migratory patterns of birds attempting to reach an unknown 
destination (Zhou et al. 2011). PSO was originally developed by Eberhart and Kennedy 
(1995) and was later expanded to include multi-objective optimization by Moore and 
Chapman (1999). In PSO, each solution is a “bird” in the migrating flock. As the flock 
flies, the birds communicate with one another, identifying the bird in the best location. 
The rest of the flock then flies toward this bird and investigates their surrounding 
environment. This social behavior is repeated until the birds reach their destination. 
PSO successfully incorporates both intelligence and social interaction, combining local 
search, where the birds learn from their own experience, and global search, where the 
birds learn from the experience of others around them (Elbeltagi et al. 2005). PSO has 
been widely used in multi-objective optimization problems in construction, including 
modeling construction site layout (Zhang and Wang 2008; Rezazadeh et al. 2009; 
Ohmori et al. 2010). 
2.6.2.2 Ant Colony Optimization 
Dorigo et al. (1996) developed ant colony optimization (ACO), a naturally inspired 
optimization technique that mimics the process of ants determining the shortest route 
between their nest and a food source (Elbeltagi et al. 2005). As ants travel, they deposit 
pheromone trails on the ground that are detected by other ants (Zhou et al. 2011). As 
the search for food begins, ants will randomly travel around all sides of an encountered 
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obstacle, initially depositing equal concentrations of pheromones from the left and right 
direction. Ants with the shortest path to food will return to their nest following their 
original path, thus depositing more pheromones. Future ants will detect this greater 
concentration of pheromones and follow the established path from their nest to the food 
source (Elbeltagi et al. 2005). Over time, favored paths that are shorter and more 
efficient will emerge because of this positive feedback mechanism (Yang 2014). ACO 
has been effectively utilized to address many multi-objective optimization problems in 
construction, including construction site layout (Baykasoglu et al. 2006; Pour and 
Nosraty 2006; Komarudin and Wong 2010), sustainability and building energy 
performance (Marzouk et al. 2012; Yuan et al. 2012). One limitation of ACO is that it 
can only be used in discrete problems (Elbeltagi et al. 2005).  
 Genetic Algorithms  
Genetic algorithms, developed by John Holland in 1975 (Holland 1975), are 
search algorithms that mimic genetic operations based up Darwin’s theory of natural 
selection (Goldberg 1989). Genetic algorithms apply survival of the fittest to obtain near-
optimum solutions by following a six-step process: (1) create a population of individual 
solutions (chromosomes); (2) calculate the value of the objective function(s) for each 
individual within the population; (3) assign a fitness value to each individual based upon 
the objective function(s); (4) perform reproduction with higher-fitness individuals having 
a higher probability of survival than individuals with lower fitness values; (5) create 
offspring by combining or varying the genotypes in the parent solutions through the 
processes of crossover and mutation; (6) repeat steps 2-5 until termination conditions 
are satisfied (Weise 2008). The structured randomness of genetic algorithms coupled 
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with the inclusion of mutation to avoid local minima give genetic algorithms the ability to 
deal with complex problems and parallelism. Genetic algorithms have been successfully 
employed in various types of optimization, where the objective function is static or 
dynamic, linear or nonlinear, continuous or discontinuous, or contains random noise 
(Yang 2014). Genetic algorithm is the most reported optimization tool used to solve 
multi-objective problems in construction engineering and management, including  
construction site layout planning (Elbeltagi et al. 2004; Khalafallah and El-Rayes 2008; 
Said and El-Rayes 2010); and renewable-energy system optimization (Bernal-Agustín 
et al. 2006; Koutroulis et al. 2006; Yang et al. 2008; Piacenza et al. 2012).  
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ASSESSMENT OF BLAST EFFECTS 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the development of a novel blast effects assessment 
model (BEAM) capable of efficiently quantifying and visualizing blast effects on 
constructed facilities behind blast walls. The model is intended to support designers in 
their critical task of analyzing and comparing all feasible design alternatives in order to 
select the most effective combination of blast wall type and building material to reduce 
the security risks to site personnel and facilities from the threat of an explosive attack. 
The model is developed in five main stages: (1) blast wall analysis stage that develops 
novel analytical formulas and a set of effectiveness factors to quantify the performance 
of feasible frangible blast wall types including sand-filled, water-filled, and wood walls in 
reducing reflected pressure and impulse loading on facilities; (2) facility damage 
assessment stage that computes the percent area of each facility within five specified 
damage levels in order to calculate an overall facility damage level; (3) blast damage 
visualization stage that displays anticipated facility damage areas based upon blast 
charge weight, blast wall type, and building material combinations; (4) performance 
analysis stage that evaluates the accuracy and efficiency of the developed model; and 
(5) case study stage that analyzes the performance of the developed model using an 
application example. The following sections provide a concise description of these five 
model development stages. 
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3.2 Blast Wall Analysis 
A blast wall is a physical barrier that separates valuable facilities from explosive 
threats (Smith 2010). Blast walls function by reflecting a portion of the explosive blast 
energy, thereby reducing reflected pressure and impulse loading on the facility 
(Remennikov and Rose 2007). This reduction in blast environment for rigid walls can be 
quantified using Eqs. (3.1) and (3.2) for reflected pressure and impulse, respectively 
(Zhou and Hao 2008). These equations, however, are limited to rigid walls and need to 
be expanded to consider feasible frangible wall types such as sand-filled, water-filled 
and wood walls that were reported to provide greater reduction in blast loading on 
facilities (Rose et al. 1997; Bogosian and Piepenburg 2002).   
 
𝐴𝐹𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑑 = −0.1359 + (0.3272 + 0.1995 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝐻
𝑆
)) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑆
𝑊1 3⁄
) 
−0.5626 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝐻
𝑆
) + 0.4666 (
𝐿
𝑆
) 
(3.1) 
 
 
𝐴𝐹𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑑 = 0.0274 + (0.4146 + 0.2393 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝐻
𝑆
)) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑆
𝑊1 3⁄
) 
−0.5044 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝐻
𝑆
) + 0.2538 (
𝐿
𝑆
) 
(3.2) 
 
where,  
𝐴𝐹𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑑 = maximum reflected pressure adjustment factor for rigid walls;  
H  = blast wall height (m); 
S  = standoff distance from explosive to facility (m); 
W  = blast charge weight (kg TNT equivalent);   
L  = distance from explosive to blast wall (m); and 
𝐴𝐹𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑑 = maximum reflected impulse adjustment factor for rigid walls.  
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To address the aforementioned limitation of Eqs. (3.1)-(3.2), this stage develops 
analytical formulas to quantify the performance of feasible frangible blast wall types in 
reducing reflected pressure and impulse loading on facilities, as shown in Eqs. (3.3)-
(3.4). These equations utilize a newly developed set of effectiveness factors that 
consider a wide range of frangible blast wall types including various thicknesses of 
balsa wood, ice walls, polystyrene, polythene sheets, revetting material, various 
thicknesses of sand-filled containers, water bag walls, and water-filled containers, as 
shown in Table 3.2.   
 𝐴𝐹𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 = 𝐴𝐹𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑑×𝐸𝐹𝑃 (3.3) 
 𝐴𝐹𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 = 𝐴𝐹𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑑×𝐸𝐹𝐼 (3.4) 
where,  
AFPmax,frangible = maximum reflected pressure adjustment factor for frangible walls; 
𝐸𝐹𝑃   = frangible wall pressure effectiveness factor; 
𝐴𝐹𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒= maximum reflected pressure adjustment factor for frangible walls; 
and 
𝐸𝐹𝑃   = frangible wall impulse effectiveness factor. 
The frangible wall pressure and impulse effectiveness factors measure the 
performance of frangible blast walls compared to a standard, rigid blast wall (Bogosian 
and Piepenburg 2002). A set of frangible wall effectiveness factors is calculated in this 
stage for 12 feasible frangible wall types by analyzing experimental data from previous 
blast wall research studies (Rose et al. 1997, 1998). Previous studies record pressure 
and impulse measurements at incremental distances or heights behind a blast wall. The 
frangible wall effectiveness factors [Eq. (3.5)-(3.6)] are computed in three steps that are 
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designed to: (1) utilize existing experimental data of recorded blast measurements at 
various locations (k) behind the blast wall; (2) calculate the ratio between the frangible 
wall pressure or impulse and rigid wall pressure or impulse for each location; and (3) 
compute the effectiveness factor by averaging all the ratios calculated in the previous 
step. For example, the pressure effectiveness factor for a thick sand wall is calculated 
using Eq. (3.5), as shown in Table 3.1. 
 
𝐸𝐹𝑃 =
∑ (
𝑃𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑘  
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑑𝑘
)𝐾𝑘=1
𝐾
 
(3.5) 
 
𝐸𝐹𝐼 =
∑ (
𝐼𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑘  
𝐼𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑑𝑘
)𝐾𝑘=1
𝐾
 
(3.6) 
where,  
k = pressure/impulse measurement location behind the blast wall at 
varying distances and/or heights (m); 
K = total number of pressure/impulse measurement locations behind 
blast wall; 
𝑃𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒  = blast pressure behind a frangible barrier at location k (kPa);  
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑑    = blast pressure behind a rigid barrier at location k (kPa) 
𝐼𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒  = blast impulse behind a frangible barrier at location k (kPa-                
ms/kg1/3); and 
𝐼𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑑    = blast impulse behind a rigid barrier at location k (kPa-ms/kg
1/3). 
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Table 3.1 Example Calculation for Effectiveness Factor of a Thick Sand Wall 
Pressure 
measurement 
location, k 
Distance from 
blast wall, S 
(m) 
Measured pressure, 
Pfrangiblek  (kPa) 
(Rose et al. 1998) 
Measured pressure, 
Prigidk  (kPa) 
(Rose et al. 1997) 
Calculated ratio, 
(
Pfrangiblek
 
Prigidk
) 
Pressure 
Effectiveness 
factor, EFP 
1 1.35 41 56 0.72 
0.74 
2 1.50 38 49 0.78 
3 1.65 35 46 0.76 
4 1.80 28 39 0.71 
 
In this stage, Eqs. (3.5)-(3.6) were used to calculate a set of newly developed 
pressure and impulse effectiveness factors for 12 feasible frangible blast wall types, 
where a value greater than one means the material will perform worse than a standard 
steel wall while a value less than one signifies that a wall will perform better than a 
standard steel wall, as shown in Table 3.2. The significance of these calculated 
effectiveness factors can be illustrated using a simplified example, as shown in Figure 
3.1 and Table 3.3. In this example, it is assumed that a 250 kg TNT explosive is 
detonated at a distance of 40 meters from a facility. The example shows the impact of 
utilizing three blast design alternatives: no wall, standard steel wall, and thick sand wall. 
The lack of a blast wall exposes the facility to a reflected pressure load of 65 kPa. The 
use of a rigid steel wall at a distance of four meters from the explosion reduces this 
peak reflected pressure by 31%, resulting in a reflected pressure load of 45 kPa, while a 
thick sand wall reduces the pressure load by 51%, resulting in a pressure load of 33 
kPa. This example shows that the use of frangible blast walls can substantially reduce 
peak reflected pressure loading on a facility. This reduction in pressure load decreases 
damages to the facility resulting in reduced loss of life, property damages and economic 
losses.  
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Table 3.2 Blast Wall Effectiveness Factors 
Wall Material 
Material 
Thickness 
(m) 
Pressure 
Effectiveness Factor 
(EFP) 
Impulse 
Effectiveness Factor 
(EFI) 
Balsa wood, thick .08 0.70 1.06 
Balsa wood, thin .02 1.33 1.33 
Ice wall, thick 0.6 0.80 0.86 
Ice wall, thin 0.3 0.97 0.93 
Polystyrene .05 0.78 1.01 
Polythene sheet <.01 1.26 1.29 
Revetting material .02 0.79 1.15 
Sand wall, thick 1.5 0.74 0.64 
Sand wall, medium 1.0 0.82 0.71 
Sand wall, thin 0.5 0.86 0.78 
Steel, standard 0.2 1.00 1.00 
Water, bag wall 0.1 0.71 0.91 
Water, filled wall 0.6 0.81 0.84 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Impact of Blast Walls on Reflected Pressure at a Constructed Facility: 
(a) No Blast Wall; (b) Rigid Steel Blast Wall; (c) Thick Sand Blast Wall 
 
Table 3.3 Blast Wall Effectiveness Factor Example Calculations 
 
Wall Type 
Pressure Effectiveness 
Factor (EFP) 
Pressure Adjustment 
Factor (AFPmax) 
Pressure (kPa)  
[Eqs. (3.9)-(3.10), (3.12)] 
No wall N/A N/A 65 
Rigid Steel 1.0 0.70 45 
Thick Sand 0.74 0.52 33 
 
Equipped with the capability of quantifying the pressure-mitigating effects of all 
feasible blast wall types, the next section will focus on the development of a blast 
effects assessment model, which is designed to calculate the percent area of each 
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facility within specified damage levels in order to determine an overall facility damage 
level from an explosive attack.  
3.3 Facility Blast Damage Assessment  
This stage presents the development of a blast effects assessment model 
(BEAM) that is capable of efficiently quantifying and visualizing blast effects on 
constructed facilities behind blast walls. This stage is accomplished in four steps: (1) 
identifying model input parameters; (2) calculating standoff distances between the 
explosive location and facilities; (3) quantifying the percent facility area within specified 
damage levels; and (4) computing total facility damages. 
 Input Parameters  
The input parameters of the developed model are selected to represent all 
feasible design alternatives in order to determine the most effective combination of blast 
wall type and building material to reduce the security risks to site personnel and facilities 
from the threat of an explosive attack. The model requires three main types of input 
parameters: (1) facility parameters: building material, facility location and orientation, 
and facility geometry; (2) blast wall parameters: wall material type, wall height and 
location; and (3) explosive parameters: blast charge weight and the location of the 
explosive. Locations within the model are identified using a grid system that allows 
decision makers to specify the grid interval. Facility locations are defined by the 
placement of their centroids on the grid system, as shown in Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2 Model Input Parameters 
 Calculate Standoff Distances Between Explosive and Facility 
Based on the aforementioned input parameters, the model is designed to 
perform blast effect assessments by computing the percent area of each facility that is 
exposed to five specified damage levels: minimal, minor, moderate, heavy and severe, 
as shown in Figure 3.3. These five damage levels (DLj) are identified in the present 
model to ensure consistency with the levels of protection and damage utilized in UFC 4-
020-01 (DoD 2008b). In order to compute these percent facility areas (PFAj), standoff 
distances (Sj) must be calculated for each combination of damage level (j), blast charge 
weight (W), blast wall type and building material. These standoff distances represent the 
minimum allowable separation distance between a facility and an explosive threat that 
will provide the desired level of protection (U.S. Dept. of the Air Force 1997). For 
example, if a reinforced concrete facility is located at a standoff distance (S2) of 55 
meters or more from a 250 kg TNT explosive, then this facility will be outside the range 
of minor damage. Existing design manuals are incapable of identifying these standoff 
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distances for facilities located behind blast walls. To address this limitation, a novel 
methodology is used to calculate blast wall-adjusted standoff distances (ASj) that 
provide an equivalent level of protection for facilities behind blast walls compared to 
existing standoff distances for facilities with no blast wall, as shown in Figure 3.4.  
 
Figure 3.3 Percent Facility Areas Subjected to Varying Damage Levels 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Blast Wall-Adjusted Standoff Distance 
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This step calculates blast wall-adjusted standoff distances (ASj) that provide 
equivalent levels of protection for facilities behind blast walls compared to existing 
standoff distance required for facilities with no blast wall, as shown in Eqs. (3.7)-(3.8) 
and Figure 3.4. ASj values are calculated in the present model for each combination of 
damage level (j), blast charge weight (W), feasible blast wall type, and building material. 
The calculation of ASj is performed in three main steps: (1) determine the standoff 
distances (Sj) for facilities with no blast wall for each combination of damage level (j), 
blast charge weight (W) and building material from existing design manuals; (2) 
calculate the reflected pressure or impulse on a facility at these determined standoff 
distances using Eqs. (3.9)-(3.10) for pressure and Eq. (3.18) for impulse; and (3) 
compute the blast wall-adjusted standoff distances (ASj) that maintain equal pressure or 
impulse to those determined in step two using a modification of the Powell hybrid 
method for nonlinear equations (Moré et al. 1980) to solve Eq. (3.7) or (3.8), as 
applicable. These three steps are discussed below. 
 𝑃𝑛𝑜 𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙,𝑆𝑗 = 𝑃𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙,𝐴𝑆𝑗 (3.7) 
 𝐼𝑛𝑜 𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙,𝑆𝑗 = 𝐼𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙,𝐴𝑆𝑗 (3.8) 
where,  
𝑃𝑛𝑜 𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙  = reflected pressure load on a facility with no blast wall (kPa);  
𝑆𝑗  = standoff distance for a facility with no blast wall at damage level j 
(m);  
𝑃𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙   = reflected pressure load on a facility behind a blast wall (kPa);  
𝐴𝑆𝑗  = blast wall-adjusted standoff distance for a facility at damage level 
j (m);  
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j   = damage level (minimal, minor, moderate, heavy, severe) 
𝐼𝑛𝑜 𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙  = reflected impulse load on a facility with no blast wall (kPa- 
ms/kg1/3); and 
𝐼𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙  = reflected impulse load on a facility behind a blast wall (kPa- 
ms/kg1/3). 
 
Figure 3.5 Calculation Steps of Blast Wall-Adjusted Standoff Distances 
First, the standoff distances required for facilities with no blast wall are 
determined for each combination of damage level, blast charge weight, and building 
material, as shown in Figure 3.5. The present model utilizes data provided in ETL 1110-
3-495 (USACE 1999) to determine these standoff distances for 150 feasible design 
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combinations (see Figure 3.5). These 150 feasible design combinations cover (1) the 
five aforementioned damage levels: minimal, minor, moderate, heavy and severe; (2) 
five blast charge weights based upon the most common method of delivery: luggage 
(22.7 kg), sedan (100 kg), sport utility vehicle (250 kg), full-size van (454.4 kg) and large 
truck (1,818.2 kg) (FEMA 2011); and (3) six prevalent building materials: unreinforced 
masonry, pre-engineered metal, timber, steel frame with lightly reinforced CMU infill 
walls, reinforced concrete, and reinforced concrete frame with lightly reinforced CMU 
infill walls, as shown in Figure 3.5. 
Second, reflected pressure or impulse loads are calculated at these determined 
standoff distances utilizing the simplified Kingery airblast equations, where reflected 
pressure and impulse are a function of the scaled distance factor (standoff 
distance/blast charge weight1/3) (Swisdak Jr 1994), as shown in Eqs. (3.9)-(3.11). These 
calculated reflected blast pressures are the Pno wall,Sj  and 𝐼𝑛𝑜 𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙,𝑆𝑗  values utilized in 
Eqs. (3.7)-(3.8) above. 
For:  
0.06 ≤
𝑆
𝑊1 3⁄
≤ 2.00: 
 
𝑃𝑛𝑜 𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙 = 𝑒
(9.006−2.6893 𝑙𝑛(
𝑆
𝑊1 3⁄
)−0.6295(𝑙𝑛(
𝑆
𝑊1 3⁄
))
2
+0.1011(𝑙𝑛(
𝑆
𝑊1 3⁄
))
3
+0.29255(𝑙𝑛(
𝑆
𝑊1 3⁄
))
4
+0.13505(𝑙𝑛(
𝑆
𝑊1 3⁄
))
5
+0.019736(𝑙𝑛(
𝑆
𝑊1 3⁄
))
6
)
 
(3.9) 
2.00 <
𝑆
𝑊1 3⁄
≤ 40.00: 
𝑃𝑛𝑜 𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙 = 𝑒
(8.8396−1.733 𝑙𝑛(
𝑆
𝑊1 3⁄
)−2.64(𝑙𝑛(
𝑆
𝑊1 3⁄
))
2
+2.293(𝑙𝑛(
𝑆
𝑊1 3⁄
))
3
−0.8232(𝑙𝑛(
𝑆
𝑊1 3⁄
))
4
+0.14247(𝑙𝑛(
𝑆
𝑊1 3⁄
))
5
−0.0099(𝑙𝑛(
𝑆
𝑊1 3⁄
))
6
)
 
(3.10) 
For:  
0.06 ≤
𝑆
𝑊1 3⁄
≤ 40: 
𝐼𝑛𝑜 𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙 = 𝑒
(6.7853−1.3466 𝑙𝑛(
𝑆
𝑊1 3⁄
)+0.101(𝑙𝑛(
𝑆
𝑊1 3⁄
))
2
−0.01123(𝑙𝑛(
𝑆
𝑊1 3⁄
))
3
)
 
(3.11) 
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Third, blast wall-adjusted standoff distances (ASj) are computed to quantify the 
impact of integrating various blast wall designs on the aforementioned standoff 
distances. As shown in Figure 3.5, this step calculates the blast wall-adjusted standoff 
distances (ASj) that maintain equal pressure or impulse to those determined in step two 
using the modified Powell hybrid method for nonlinear equations to solve Eqs. (3.7)-
(3.8). This step computes 4,500 unique ASj values by quantifying the performance of 30 
feasible blast walls in reducing reflected pressure or impulse loading on facilities for 
each of the 150 design combinations of damage level, blast charge weight and building 
material identified above. These 30 blast walls cover all possible combinations of: (1) 15 
blast wall types, including the 12 frangible walls with the newly developed effectiveness 
factors listed in Table 3.2, a standard rigid steel wall (Zhou and Hao 2008), and precast 
concrete panel and concrete masonry unit (CMU) walls (Bogosian and Piepenburg 
2002); and (2) two blast wall heights of two meters and five meters. In order to perform 
these computations, it is necessary to quantify the performance of feasible frangible and 
rigid blast walls in reducing reflected pressure and impulse loading on facilities. This 
reduction in peak reflected pressure loading on facilities is quantified by multiplying the 
blast pressure on a facility when no wall is present (Pno wall) from Eqs. (3.9)-(3.10), by 
the appropriate blast wall pressure adjustment factor (AFPmax), as shown in Eq. (3.12). 
The reduction in reflected impulse loading on facilities is quantified by multiplying the 
reflected impulse on a facility when no wall is present (Ino wall) from Eq. (3.11) by the 
appropriate blast wall impulse adjustment factor ( AFImax ), as shown in Eq. (3.13). 
Utilizing this process, the modified Powell hybrid method for nonlinear equations is then 
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used to solve Eqs. (3.7)-(3.8), as applicable, by computing the ASj value where Pwall,ASj 
equals the Pno wall,Sj or Iwall,ASj equals the Ino wall,Sj calculated in step two.  
 𝑃𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙 = 𝐴𝐹𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥× 𝑃𝑛𝑜 𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙 (3.12) 
 𝐼𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙 = 𝐴𝐹𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑥× 𝐼𝑛𝑜 𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙 (3.13) 
The computations performed in the aforementioned three steps can be illustrated 
using a simple example, as shown in Figure 3.4. In this example, it is assumed that a 
reinforced concrete facility is required to be located outside the range of minor damage 
(j = 2) in the event of a 250 kg TNT explosive attack. The designers wish to compare the 
standoff distance required for the facility with no blast wall to the blast wall-adjusted 
standoff distance required when a two-meter tall, thick sand wall is constructed to 
protect the facility. In the first step, ETL 1110-3-495  (USACE 1999) is used to 
determine that a 55-meter standoff distance (Sj) is required to provide the desired level 
of protection for the facility with no blast wall. In the second step, the simplified Kingery 
airblast equations (Swisdak Jr 1994) are used to calculate the Pno wall,Sj value for the 
standoff distance determined in the first step. At a standoff distance of 55 meters, 
solving Eq. (3.10) shows that the facility will experience a reflected pressure load of 39 
kPa. In the third step, the blast wall-adjusted standoff distance for the facility protected 
by a two-meter tall, thick sand wall that results in an equal pressure load of 39 kPa is 
computed by solving Eq. (3.7) utilizing the modified Powell hybrid method for nonlinear 
equations. This computation yields a blast wall-adjusted standoff distance (AS2) of 36 
meters. This calculation can be verified and further explained by using Eq. (3.12). When 
AS2 is 36 meters, Pwall,36m is calculated by multiplying Pno wall [calculated with Eq. (3.10)] 
at 36 meters by the AFPmax [calculated with Eq. (3.3)] for a two-meter tall, thick sand wall 
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that is assumed to be located four meters from the blast. Performing these calculations 
results in a Pno wall  of 76 kPa and a AFPmax  of 0.51, which multiplied together verify 
Pwall,36m  as 39 kPa. This example demonstrates that frangible blast walls can 
substantially reduce the standoff distance required to provide an equivalent level of 
protection for a facility compared to the standoff distance required for a facility with no 
blast wall. Further, this reduction in required standoff distance greatly increases site 
layout planning flexibility, enabling designers to construct additional facilities in the 
freed-up site space or reduce the site footprint in order to realize real-estate savings.  
 Quantify the Percent Facility Area within Specified Damage Levels 
This step quantifies the percent area of each facility within the five damage levels 
(PFAij) by calculating the area of intersection between blast damage areas, which are 
determined by utilizing the blast wall-adjusted standoff distances (ASj) computed in the 
previous step, and the facility area (FAi), as shown in Figure 3.3. Each damage level 
(DLj) is represented as a ring, centered at the anticipated blast location, with a radius 
equal to the calculated standoff distance. The areas are then converted to percentages 
by dividing the area of intersection by the total facility area and multiplying by 100%, as 
shown in Eq. (3.14). This model utilizes the intersection function within Shapely, an 
existing Python package used for manipulation and analysis of planar geometric objects 
based on the GEOS (Geometry Engine, Open Source) and JTS (Java Topology Suite) 
libraries to automate these calculations (Gillies 2013). These percent areas of each 
facility within the five damage levels (PFAij) are utilized in the next section to compute 
the total facility damage level. 
 
𝑃𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑗 =
𝐹𝐴𝑖 ∩ 𝐷𝐿𝑗
𝐹𝐴𝑖
× 100% 
(3.14) 
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where,  
𝑃𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑗  = percent area of a facility i within damage level j;  
i   = facility number;  
𝐹𝐴𝑖   = area of facility i (m
2); and   
𝐷𝐿𝑗   = area of damage level j (m
2). 
 Compute Total Facility Damages 
The final step in quantifying the blast effects on constructed facilities behind blast 
walls is computing the total percentage of damage to each facility (PFDi). PFDi is the 
sum of the percent facility area (PFAj) multiplied by the percent destruction (PDj) for all 
the five damage levels (j) considered in this model, as shown in Eq. (3.15). The PDj 
value for these five damage levels (minimal, minor, moderate, heavy, and severe) is 
considered in this model to be 10%, 20%, 40%, 60%, and 100% respectively. These 
PDj values are identified based on the upper limit of the reported ranges of destruction 
for each of these five damage levels in existing design manuals (USACE 1999; FEMA 
2011; DoD 2012). 
 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑖 = ∑ 𝑃𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑗×𝑃𝐷𝑗
5
𝑗=1
 
(3.15) 
where,  
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑖  = total percentage of damage to facility i;  
𝑃𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑗   = percent area of facility i in damage category j; and  
𝑃𝐷𝑗  = percent destruction caused by damage category j. 
The model is capable of quantifying the expected damages on multiple 
constructed facilities behind blast walls from a single explosive attack. The next section 
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discusses the output of 2-D visualizations of the impact of an explosive attack on 
multiple facilities to support designers in their critical task of identifying the most 
effective design for blast walls and facility hardening. 
3.4 Blast Damage Visualization 
This stage presents the development of blast damage visualizations that display 
the results calculated from the aforementioned blast effects assessment model. These 
calculations are performed using Python programming language (Rossum 1995) and 
the blast damage visualizations are generated using the 2-D plotting library matplotlib 
(Hunter 2007). The blast damage visualizations represent an effective tool to analyze 
the impact of various design combinations on the level of blast damages in all analyzed 
facilities. These generated visualizations provide designers with practical and reliable 
graphical illustrations that show the impact of a single blast on the level of damages in 
all facilities on site for each feasible design combination of blast charge weight, blast 
wall type, and building material.  
The generated visualizations represent the five damage levels (DLj) as rings, 
where each of these rings is centered at the anticipated blast location and has a radius 
equal to its corresponding calculated standoff distance (ASj), as shown in Figure 3.6(a). 
The developed model enables designers to specify the color and line styles of these 
rings to support their blast damage analysis. For example, designers can specify 
varying colors for each of the rings representing the five damage levels when all 
facilities have the same building material, as shown in Figure 3.6(a), where dark red, 
red, orange, yellow, and green represent the severe, heavy, moderate, minor, and 
minimal damage levels, respectively. If the site consists of facilities constructed of 
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multiple building materials, designers can use various line styles to represent the 
damage level rings for different materials, as shown in Figure 3.6(b), where solid lines 
are used to represent the damage level rings for the timber facilities and dashed lines 
are used to represent the damage level rings for reinforced concrete facilities. In 
addition, the model enables designers to utilize hatch patterns to represent different 
building materials. For example, in Figure 3.6, the diagonal (/) pattern is used to 
represent timber facilities while the dotted pattern (.) is used to represent reinforced 
concrete facilities. Furthermore, facility colors can be used to represent the overall 
facility damage level, enabling designers to easily visualize the level of damage suffered 
by each facility.  
 
Figure 3.6 Colored Rings Representing Five Damage Levels: (a) One Building 
Material; (b) Two Building Materials 
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These generated visualizations provide designers with a practical and reliable 
analysis tool to assess the results of the design scenario and determine the level of 
protection provided for each constructed facility. They enable designers to: (1) perform 
a visual risk management assessment of the design scenario; and (2) determine if any 
design changes are needed to provide the required level of protection for constructed 
facilities. For example, the generated visualization in Figure 3.7(a) presents a design 
scenario where the calculated damage level exceeds the designers’ maximum 
acceptable facility damage level.  
In this example, a five-meter-tall, steel blast wall is constructed to protect a 
timber facility from a 250 kg explosive attack at a standoff distance of 20 meters. The 
designers have specified an acceptable facility damage level of minimal for their design 
scenario; however, the blast damage visualizations and model output data show that 
this design results in a facility damage level of 40%, which corresponds to a heavy 
damage level. As the anticipated damage level exceeds the minimum acceptable level 
of protection for the facility, design changes are needed to reduce the security risks to 
site personnel and facilities from this explosive threat.  
Figures Figure 3.7(b) and (c) provide examples of alternative design scenarios 
that utilize the two primary design strategies used to reduce blast effects on facilities in 
order to increase the anticipated level of protection. First, designers attempt to 
maximize the standoff distance between the facility and the anticipated location of the 
explosive, as shown in Figure 3.7(b). By increasing the standoff distance from 20 
meters to 80 meters, the anticipated facility damage level is reduced from 40% to 10%, 
which is within the designer’s maximum acceptable facility damage level. Second, if a 
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sufficient standoff distance to provide the desired level of protection cannot be 
achieved, designers must select blast walls and/or building materials that provide 
greater levels of blast protection. Figure 3.7(c) displays the results of one possible 
design alternative where a five-meter-tall, thick sand blast wall is constructed to protect 
a steel frame facility. This design alternative results in a facility damage level of 10%, 
corresponding to a minimal damage level, which meets the designer’s acceptable 
facility damage level.  
 
Figure 3.7 Alternative Design Scenarios to Minimize Damage Level in Constructed 
Facility (a) 20 m Standoff, Timber Facility, Steel Blast Wall; (b) 80 m Standoff, 
Timber Facility, Steel Blast Wall; (c) 20 m Standoff Distance, Steel Frame Facility, 
Thick Sand Blast Wall 
3.5 Performance Analysis 
The purpose of this stage is to analyze the performance of the present model by 
comparing its results to those generated by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s 
Vulnerability Assessment and Protection Option (VAPO) software, version 6.2 (USACE 
PDC 2016). VAPO was selected in this analysis because of its: (1) capability of 
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simultaneously predicting blast loads on facilities and accounting for the structural 
response of individual building components; and (2) computational efficiency in 
generating and analyzing multiple designs scenarios in a relatively short time (Nichols 
and Doyle 2014). This performance analysis was performed by evaluating 114 design 
configurations that consisted of 54 configurations with no blast walls and 60 
configurations with steel blast walls. The design configurations were analyzed using a 
2.0 GHz quad-core Intel Core i7 processor with 6 MB of cache memory and 16 GB of 
SDRAM.   
The performance of BEAM was analyzed using two metrics: accuracy and 
efficiency. The accuracy of the present model was evaluated by calculating the: (1) 
average difference between the generated reflected pressure and impulse by the 
present model and VAPO (∆P and ∆I, respectively), as shown in Eqs. (3.16)-(3.17); and 
(2) the percent difference between the reflected pressure and impulse results generated 
by the two models (%P and %I, respectively), as shown in Eqs. (3.18)-(3.19). These 
average and percent differences were calculated for a wide range of possible design 
scenarios that represent the most probable security threats faced by designers. In total, 
114 combinations of building materials, blast charge weights, standoff distances and 
utilization of blast walls were analyzed, including 54 design configurations with no blast 
wall and 60 with blast walls. In the first set of analyzed design configurations with no 
blast walls, reflected pressure and impulse loads on facilities were calculated for 54 
feasible combinations of: (1) six building materials (unreinforced masonry, pre-
engineered metal, timber, steel frame with lightly reinforced CMU infill walls, reinforced 
concrete, and reinforced concrete frame with lightly reinforced CMU infill walls); and (2) 
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nine combinations of blast charge weights and standoff distances. As shown in Figure 
3.8,  these nine combinations of blast charge weights and standoff distances include: 
(a) blast charge weights of 100 and 250 kg at a standoff distance of 25 meters; (b) blast 
charge weights of 100, 250, 454.5, and 1,818.2 kg at a standoff distance of 50 meters; 
and (c) blast charge weights of 250, 454.5, and 1,1818.2 kg at a standoff distance of 
100 meters. For each of these nine combinations of standoff distance and blast charge 
weight, the average reflected pressure that was calculated by the present model and 
VAPO for the analyzed six building materials is displayed in Figure 3.8. 
In the second set of design configurations with blast walls, reflected pressure and 
impulse loads on facilities behind a five-meter-tall, steel blast wall were calculated for 60 
feasible combinations of: (1) six building materials (unreinforced masonry, pre-
engineered metal, timber, steel frame with lightly reinforced CMU infill walls, reinforced 
concrete, and reinforced concrete frame with lightly reinforced CMU infill walls); and (2) 
ten combinations of blast charge weights and standoff distances. As shown in Figure 
3.9, these ten combinations of blast charge weights and standoff distances include: (a) 
blast charge weights of 100, 250 and 454.5 kg at a standoff distance of 25 meters; (b) 
blast charge weights of 100, 250, 454.5, and 1818.2 kg at a standoff distance of 50 
meters; and (c) blast charge weights of 250, 454.5, and 1,1818.2 kg at a standoff 
distance of 100 meters. For each of these ten combinations of standoff distance and 
blast charge weight, the average reflected pressure that was calculated by the present 
model and VAPO for the analyzed six building materials is displayed in Figure 3.9. 
The results of the conducted analysis verify that the methodology of calculating 
blast loads in this component of the model by utilizing the simplified Kingery airblast 
  
 
81 
equations (Swisdak Jr 1994) and the rigid wall adjustment factors (Zhou and Hao 2008) 
generates results that are very close to those generated by VAPO, as shown in Figure 
3.8 and Figure 3.9. The average and percent reflected pressure differences between 
the two models were 1.9 kPa and 4.0% for the no wall configurations and 1.2 kPa and 
3.9% for the steel wall configurations. The average and percent reflected impulse 
differences between the two models were 83 kPa-ms/kg1/3 and 12.0% for the no wall 
configurations and 39 kPa-ms/kg1/3 and 10% for the steel wall configurations. These 
differences in calculated blast loads between BEAM and VAPO are minor, and may only 
lead to slightly more conservative design outcomes.  
 
∆𝑃 =
∑ (𝑃𝐵𝐸𝐴𝑀𝑐−𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑃𝑂𝑐)
𝐶
𝑐=1
𝐶
 (3.16) 
 
∆𝐼 =
∑ (𝐼𝐵𝐸𝐴𝑀𝑐−𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑃𝑂𝑐)
𝐶
𝑐=1
𝐶
 (3.17) 
 
 
%𝑃 =
(∑ (
𝑃𝐵𝐸𝐴𝑀𝑐 − 𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑃𝑂𝑐
𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑃𝑂𝑐
) ×100%𝐶𝑐=1 )
𝐶
 
(3.18) 
 
%𝐼 =
(∑ (
𝐼𝐵𝐸𝐴𝑀𝑐 − 𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑃𝑂𝑐
𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑃𝑂𝑐
) ×100%𝐶𝑐=1 )
𝐶
 
(3.19) 
where,  
∆𝑃 = average reflected pressure difference between BEAM and VAPO 
(kPa); 
𝑐   = design configuration number;  
C  = total number of design configurations; 
𝑃𝐵𝐸𝐴𝑀 = reflected pressure load on a facility as calculated by the present 
blast effects assessment model for configuration c (kPa); 
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𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑃𝑂 = reflected pressure load on a facility as calculated by VAPO for 
configuration c (kPa);  
∆𝐼 = average reflected impulse difference between BEAM and VAPO 
(kPa-ms/kg1/3); 
%P  = average percent reflected pressure difference between BEAM 
and VAPO at a given standoff distance; and 
%I  = average percent reflected impulse difference between BEAM and 
VAPO at a given standoff distance. 
 
Figure 3.8 Average Peak Reflected Pressure for Six Building Materials and No 
Blast Wall 
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Figure 3.9 Average Peak Reflected Pressure for Six Building Materials and with 
Blast Wall 
 
The efficiency of the present model was analyzed by recording the amount of 
time required by BEAM and VAPO to perform blast damage computations and generate 
blast damage visualizations for each design scenario. BEAM required an average 
completion time of 0.18 seconds per design scenario while VAPO required 11 seconds 
per design scenario. This illustrates that the present model requires only 1.7% of the 
computational time required by VAPO to perform facility blast damage assessments. 
The results of this performance analysis highlight the accuracy and efficiency of the 
developed model. 
3.6 Case Study 
The purpose of this stage is to analyze a case study to illustrate the use of the 
model and demonstrate its distinctive capabilities. To illustrate the use of the model, the 
case study seeks to identify the best design configuration for a 512 m2 one-story 
constructed facility. The anticipated security threat in this case study is a 454.5 kg TNT 
explosive attack, assumed to be detonated on a road adjacent to the blast wall at a 
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distance of four meters from the blast wall. Designers are considering a wide range of 
feasible design alternatives that include 15 blast wall materials, two wall heights, six 
building materials and three possible facility locations. As shown in Figure 3.10, these 
feasible design parameters produce 540 design alternatives for this case study that 
need to be analyzed by designers to determine the design configuration that provides 
the greatest level of facility protection. 
 
Figure 3.10 Case Study Feasible Design Alternatives 
To analyze this case study, designers need to input: (1) the blast charge weight 
and its Cartesian coordinates, (2) facility dimensions, Cartesian coordinates of its 
centroid and its orientation (degrees), (3) selection of blast wall type from 30 feasible 
alternatives, and (4) selection of building material from six feasible alternatives. The 
output of the model contains the blast wall-adjusted standoff distances (ASj) for each of 
the five damage levels (DLj), the percent area of the facility within each of the five 
damage levels (PFAj), the calculated total percentage of damage to the facility (PFDi), 
and the generated 2-D visualizations of the anticipated facility damage areas for the 
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specified combination of blast charge weight (W), blast wall type, building material, and 
facility location, as shown in Figure 3.11. 
 
Figure 3.11 Model Output Data and Generated 2-D Visualization 
The present model was used to analyze the aforementioned 540 design 
alternatives for this case study. The results of this analysis enabled designers to select 
the configuration that is most suitable for their specified needs. Absent project cost and 
material availability limitations, designers will select the configuration that provides the 
greatest level of facility protection. This configuration, shown in Figure 3.12(a), requires 
the construction of a reinforced concrete frame facility, behind a five-meter-tall, precast 
concrete panel blast wall at a standoff distance of 40 meters and a rotation of 90 
degrees. This design configuration results in a total percent facility destruction level of 
1%.  
In addition, designers may need to explore other solutions that provide the lowest 
level of damage when using specified blast wall types and/or building materials that are 
available or cost effective in their location. For example, if designers require the 
construction of a CMU blast wall to protect their facility, the design configuration that 
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provides the greatest level of protection is shown in Figure 3.12(b). This configuration 
requires the construction of a reinforced concrete frame facility at a standoff distance of 
40 meters and a rotation of 90 degrees, and the building of a five-meter-tall CMU blast 
wall. This design configuration results in a total percent facility destruction level of 10%.  
Furthermore, designers may specify their preference for blast wall type, building 
material and/or facility location and seek to determine the configuration that provides the 
greatest level of protection while incorporating their stated design preferences. For 
example, designers may specify their preference to construct a timber facility. Figure 
3.12(c) displays the configuration that provides the greatest level of protection for a 
timber facility. This configuration requires constructing a five-meter-tall, precast concrete 
panel blast wall and siting the facility at a standoff distance of 40 meters and a rotation 
of 90 degrees. This best-case scenario for a timber facility results in a total percent 
facility destruction level of 20%. The ability of the present model to analyze a wide 
range of feasible design alternatives enables designers to identify an optimal solution 
that best addresses the specified needs and limitations of their project. 
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Figure 3.12 Sample Case Study Results 
The analysis of the case study illustrates the unique capabilities of the present 
model in: (1) efficiently predicting the blast damage level on facilities for a wide range of 
feasible design alternatives of blast charge weight, blast wall type, building material and 
facility location; (2) quantifying the effectiveness of feasible frangible blast wall types in 
reducing blast loading on facilities; and (3) generating visualizations of the anticipated 
facility damage areas based upon the blast charge weight, blast wall type and building 
material combinations. 
The first distinctive capability of the present model is its ability to efficiently 
predict the blast damage level on the constructed facility for all feasible design 
alternatives identified. The model gains its computational efficiency by incorporating a 
database that contains the aforementioned 30 blast wall types and six building 
materials, enabling designers to analyze all possible combinations in a single run 
without the need to input the values for each possible combination. This capability 
enabled the present model to analyze the 540 possible design combinations for this 
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case study, as shown in Figure 3.13, in a total computational time of 97 seconds or an 
average of 0.18 seconds per design scenario. BEAM’s ability to efficiently analyze the 
performance of all feasible design scenarios for constructed facilities in resisting the 
effects of an explosive attack allows for improvement and optimization in facility design 
that was previously infeasible using existing blast models. 
 
Figure 3.13 Generated Case Study Results 
The second distinctive capability of the present model is its ability to quantify the 
effectiveness of feasible frangible blast wall types in reducing blast loading on facilities 
compared to a standard, rigid wall. This reduction in blast loading on facilities is capable 
of producing significant reduction in expected damages to the facility. Using facility 
location 1 from this case study as an example, the design configuration that returns the 
lowest percent facility destruction for a facility behind a rigid blast wall is to construct a 
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steel frame facility behind a five-meter-tall, steel blast wall. This design configuration 
results in a total percent facility destruction level of 18%. Constructing the same steel 
frame facility behind a frangible, five-meter-tall, precast concrete panel wall reduces the 
percent facility destruction level to 7%. Similar blast assessment models are incapable 
of considering frangible walls and their effectiveness in reducing blast loading on 
facilities. This inability to consider more effective frangible blast wall types limits the 
ability of designers to maximize the safety of their facilities and exposes their occupants 
to increased risk of loss of life, property damages, and economic losses in the event of 
an explosive attack.  
The third distinctive capability of the present model is its ability to generate 
visualizations of the anticipated facility damage areas based upon the blast charge 
weight, blast wall type, and building material combinations. Existing models are 
incapable of generating visualizations that account for the pressure-mitigating effects of 
feasible rigid and frangible blast wall types. BEAM’s ability to rapidly generate 
visualizations provides designers with a practical and reliable analysis tool to assess the 
impact of utilizing various frangible and rigid blast wall types to protect their constructed 
facilities. These generated visualizations enable designers to perform a visual risk 
management assessment of the design scenario and easily determine if any design 
changes are required to provide the desired level of protection for their constructed 
facilities.  
3.7 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter presented a blast effects assessment model for quantifying and 
visualizing blast effects on constructed facilities behind rigid or frangible blast walls. The 
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model was developed in five main stages: (1) blast wall analysis stage that developed a 
methodology to quantify the performance of feasible frangible blast wall types including 
sand-filled, water-filled, and wood walls in reducing reflected pressure and impulse 
loading on facilities; (2) facility damage assessment stage that computed the percent 
area of each facility within five specified damage levels in order to calculate an overall 
facility damage level; (3) blast damage visualization stage that displayed anticipated 
facility damage areas based upon blast charge weight, blast wall type, and building 
material combinations; (4) performance analysis stage that evaluated the accuracy and 
efficiency of the developed model; and (5) case study stage that analyzed the 
performance of the developed model using an application example. The analysis of this 
case study illustrated the use of the model and demonstrated its unique capabilities. 
The model was able to efficiently predict the blast damage level for a constructed facility 
and generate blast damage visualizations for 540 feasible design alternatives 
comprised of 15 blast wall materials, two blast wall heights, six building materials, and 
three possible facility locations. The total computational time required for the model to 
analyze and generate results for these 540 feasible design alternatives was 97 seconds 
or an average of 0.18 seconds per design scenario.  
The primary contribution of this research is the development of a novel model 
that enables designers to efficiently and accurately analyze and compare all feasible 
design alternatives in order to select an optimal design solution that minimizes the 
security risks to site personnel and facilities from the threat of an explosive attack. This 
developed model should prove useful for designers and construction managers of high-
threat sites, allowing them to evaluate design options that may not have been previously 
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considered because of the significant computational time and effort required by 
numerical blast assessment models. The end result is a greater likelihood of designing 
a site that meets the functional and security requirements established by the site 
owners.   
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FACILITY PROTECTION OPTIMIZATION MODEL 
4.1 Introduction  
The chapter presents the development of a multi-objective model for optimizing 
the site layout and selection of perimeter blast walls and building materials in order to 
minimize facility destruction levels from explosive attacks while minimizing site 
construction costs. The model is intended to equip planners of remote construction sites 
with the capability to efficiently analyze and compare all feasible design alternatives in 
order to construct remote sites that minimize the security risks to site personnel and 
facilities from the threat of explosive attacks in the most cost-effective manner. The 
model is developed in three main stages: (1) formulation stage that defines the relevant 
decision variables, formulates the objective functions, and identifies practical model 
constraints; (2) implementation stage that performs the optimization computations using 
multi-objective genetic algorithm; and (3) performance evaluation stage that analyzes 
an application example to evaluate and improve model performance. The following 
sections describe the three developmental stages of the present model.  
4.2 Model Formulation 
This stage presents the formulation of a novel multi-objective optimization model 
for optimizing the site layout and selection of perimeter blast walls and building 
materials for remote construction sites. This stage is accomplished in three steps: (1) 
defining the model decision variables; (2) formulating the facility destruction and 
construction cost objective functions; and (3) identifying all practical model constraints. 
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 Decision Variables  
The decision variables of the developed optimization model are selected to 
represent all feasible design alternatives of site layout and selection of perimeter blast 
walls and building materials. As shown in Figure 4.1, the model incorporates these 
decision variables in two main groups: (1) perimeter decision variables; and (2) facility 
decision variables. The first group represents all the decision variables that affect the 
location and performance of perimeter blast walls including perimeter location (PL), 
perimeter type (T) and perimeter height (H). The model enables planners to specify a 
feasible set of design alternatives for each of these three perimeter decision variables. 
The second group incorporates all the decision variables that affect the location and 
performance of site facilities including facility location (FLi), facility orientation (𝜃𝑖), and 
building material (Mi). Facility locations are defined within the model by the placement of 
their centroids on a user-specified grid system that allows planners to establish their 
preferred grid interval. Facility orientation is the degree that the facility is rotated about 
its centroid and is specified in this model to be 0 or 90°, which represents the most 
widely used orientations for rectangular shaped facility layouts. Facility location 1 (FL1) 
in Figure 4.1 shows the two possible facility rotation angles for a single facility location. 
Finally, building material will be selected from a set of feasible design alternatives that 
are specified by planners.  
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Figure 4.1 Model Decision Variables 
 Objective Functions 
The present model is designed to accomplish two primary objectives: (1) 
minimize site facility destruction levels from explosive attacks; and (2) minimize site 
construction costs.  
4.2.2.1 Minimizing Site Facility Destruction Levels 
The first objective function in the present model is designed to minimize the 
destruction of site facilities inflicted by a specified explosive threat based on the 
performance of the selected site layout, perimeter blast walls and building materials. As 
shown in Eq. (4.1), the destruction of site facilities is quantified as the site destruction 
index (SDI), which ranges from 0% to 100%, where 0% represents no destruction and 
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100% represents complete destruction. SDI is quantified as the sum of the percent 
destruction of each facility (PFDi) multiplied by the importance weight of each facility on 
the site (𝑤𝑖), as assigned by project planners. The use of importance weights provides 
planners with the flexibility to assign priority to facilities based on their criticality to the 
mission and purpose of the remote construction site.    
The percent destruction of each facility (PFDi)  is calculated using a recently 
developed model for quantifying blast effects on facilities behind blast walls (Schuldt 
and El-Rayes 2017) in five main phases that focus on: (1) establishing specified facility 
damage levels (j); (2) defining the percent destruction of each facility damage level 
(PDj); (3) quantifying the standoff distances from an explosive at which each facility 
damage level is suffered; (4) determining the portion of every facility within each of the 
five damage level zones; and (5) computing the total percent destruction of each facility, 
as shown in Figure 4.2. The first phase of calculation establishes five facility damage 
levels (j), characterized by an increasing level of destruction: minimal, minor, moderate, 
heavy, and severe. This use of facility damage levels is consistent with established blast 
design practices and manuals (USACE 1999; DoD 2008b; FEMA 2011). The second 
phase defines the percent destruction for each facility damage level (PDj) from a range 
of destruction as reported in existing design manuals (USACE 1999; FEMA 2011; DoD 
2012). The PDj values utilized in the present model for the five specified damage levels 
are 10%, 20%, 40%, 60%, and 100%, respectively, which represent the upper limit of 
these reported ranges in the aforementioned design manuals. The third phase 
quantifies the standoff distances at which the facility damage levels occur for each 
design scenario. These standoff distances form rings, centered at the blast location, that 
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define the zone in which each facility damage level (DLj) is suffered. The fourth phase 
utilizes Shapely (Gillies 2013), a spatial analysis software package, to determine the 
portion of every facility within each of the five damage level zones. This phase employs 
automated computational geometry based on the defined grid-interval system to 
calculate the intersection areas of each facility and damage level zone. These 
intersection areas are expressed as the percent area of each facility within each of the 
five damage level zones (PFAij). The fifth phase computes the percent destruction of 
each facility (PFDi) as the sum of the percent area of a facility within each of the five 
damage level zones (PFAij) multiplied by the corresponding percent destruction of each 
damage level (PDj).  
The aforementioned third phase requires detailed calculations to quantify the 
required standoff distances, which are the minimum acceptable separation distances 
between facilities and explosive attacks that will provide the specified levels of 
protection (U.S. Dept. of the Air Force 1997), for each feasible design combination that 
considers varying damage levels (j), blast charge weights (W), building materials (M), 
and perimeter blast wall types (T), and heights (H), if any. The present model is 
designed to provide the flexibility to quantify the required standoff distances for: (a) 
perimeter types that provide no blast attenuation, such as chain-link fence; and (b) rigid 
and frangible wall types that provide varying levels of blast attenuation. As shown in 
Figure 4.2, these detailed calculations of phase three are performed in three steps that 
are designed to: (1) identify the required standoff distances for perimeter types that 
provide no blast attenuation (Sj); (2) calculate blast loads on facilities at the identified 
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standoff distances; and (3) quantify the blast wall-adjusted standoff distances (ASj) 
where blast loads on facilities are equal to those calculated in step two.   
The first step identifies the required standoff distances for each combination of 
facility damage level (j), blast charge weight (W), and building material (M) for perimeter 
types that provide no blast attenuation, as shown in Figure 4.2. To determine these 
standoff distances, planners typically perform the time-consuming and often error-prone 
process of manually extracting the data for each design scenario from existing design 
manuals and charts (USACE 1999; DoD 2002, 2008a). The present model overcomes 
this limitation by automatically and accurately extracting the standoff distances for each 
design combination utilizing WebPlotDigitizer (Rohatgi 2016). The model integrates a 
constructed database containing the standoff distances for each combination of facility 
damage level, blast charge weights ranging from 22.7 kg to 18,182 kg, and the most 
commonly used building materials. This automated extraction process (a) eliminates the 
tedious requirement for planners to manually extract data for each design scenario; (b) 
ensures accuracy and high data fidelity levels within the model; and (c) greatly 
increases model computational efficiency. When blast walls are utilized, further 
calculations are necessary to quantify the blast wall-adjusted standoff distances (ASj) 
required to provide an equivalent level of protection for facilities behind blast walls 
compared to the standoff distances (Sj) for facilities behind perimeter types that provide 
no blast attenuation. 
The second step calculates the blast loads on facilities at the standoff distances 
identified in step one. This step computes the total applied force acting upon an 
identified facility that causes the specified level of damage. The present model is 
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designed to perform these calculations on the basis of peak reflected pressure (kPa) 
and reflected impulse (kPa-ms/kg1/3). The listed equations in this paper present the 
performed calculations based on reflected impulse and it should be noted that the 
model computations based on reflected pressure are performed using a similar 
methodology. The reflected impulse loads are calculated for the standoff distances 
extracted from the aforementioned design manuals and charts in step one utilizing the 
Kingery-Bulmash equations (Kingery and Bulmash 1984), where reflected impulse is a 
function of scaled distance (standoff distance/blast charge weight1/3).  
The third step quantifies the blast wall-adjusted standoff distances (ASj) where 
the reflected impulse loads on facilities behind rigid or frangible walls are equal to the 
reflected impulse loads at the standoff distances (Ino wall,Sj)  calculated in step two, 
utilizing a hybrid solving method for nonlinear equations (Moré et al. 1980). Therefore, 
ASj are the distances that provide an equivalent level of protection for facilities behind 
blast walls compared to the standoff distances for facilities behind perimeter types that 
provide no blast attenuation (Sj) identified in step one. The reflected impulse load 
behind a blast wall is calculated as the product of the impulse load when no wall is 
present (Ino wall,ASj), the maximum reflected impulse adjustment factor for a rigid wall 
(AFImax,R) (Zhou and Hao 2008), and the blast wall impulse effectiveness factor (EFI), 
as shown in Eq. (4.2) and Figure 4.2. EFI is a ratio that measures the performance of 
frangible blast wall types compared to a rigid blast wall in reducing impulse loading on 
facilities (Bogosian and Piepenburg 2002). As shown in Figure 4.3, the present model 
utilizes a newly developed set of effectiveness factors that expands the capability of 
AFImax,R to consider the effectiveness of feasible frangible blast wall types, which have 
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been reported to provide comparable or greater levels of blast mitigation than a 
standard, rigid wall (Bogosian and Piepenburg 2002; Rose et al. 1998). 
 
Figure 4.2 Phase Calculations of Percent Facility Destruction 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Newly Developed Set of Impulse Effectiveness Factors for 12 Frangible 
Wall Types 
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𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑆𝐷𝐼 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖×
𝐼
𝑖=1
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑖 
(4.1) 
 𝐼𝑟,𝑆𝑗 = 𝐼𝑟,𝐴𝑆𝑗×𝐴𝐹𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑅×𝐸𝐹𝐼 (4.2) 
where,  
SDI  = site destruction index; 
i  = facility number; 
I  = total number of facilities;  
𝑤𝑖  = importance weight for each facility i, where wi > 0 and   
       ∑ 𝑤𝑖 = 1
𝐼
𝑖=1 ;  
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑖  = total percentage of destruction to facility i;  
𝐼𝑟  = reflected impulse load on a facility (kPa-ms/kg1/3);  
𝑆𝑗  = standoff distance for a facility with no blast wall at damage level j 
(m);  
𝐴𝑆𝑗  = blast wall-adjusted standoff distance for a facility at damage level    
j (m);  
𝐴𝐹𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑅  = maximum reflected impulse adjustment factor for rigid walls; and 
𝐸𝐹𝐼   = blast wall impulse effectiveness factor. 
4.2.2.2 Minimizing Construction Cost 
The second objective function in the present model is designed to minimize the 
construction costs of integrating site security measures that include constructing 
perimeter blast walls and hardening site facilities. As shown in Eq. (4.3), the site 
construction cost (SCC) incorporates initial construction costs (ICC) and the present 
value of future wall replacement costs (WRC). First, ICC is comprised of the perimeter 
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wall construction costs and facility hardening costs [see Eq. (4.4)]. Perimeter wall costs 
are calculated as the product of the perimeter wall length (PL) and the wall construction 
unit cost (WCT,H), as shown in Eq. (4.4). The total perimeter wall length is calculated 
based upon the selection of the blast wall location decision variable from the set of 
feasible alternatives defined by planners. The wall construction unit cost is the cost to 
construct a linear meter of the selected blast wall based upon the wall type (T) and wall 
height (H). Facility hardening costs are calculated using the facility area (FAi) and the 
facility construction unit cost (FCM). The facility construction unit cost is the cost to 
construct a square meter of the selected building material (M). The total facility 
hardening cost is equal to the sum of the facility area multiplied by the facility 
construction unit cost for all site facilities, as shown in Eq. (4.4). 
Second, the present value of future perimeter wall replacement costs (WRC) is 
computed as the product of the perimeter wall length of the selected blast wall location 
(PLWL), the number of times a wall must be replaced over the anticipated site lifespan, 
the wall replacement unit cost (WRT,H), and discount rate (D) to calculate the present 
value of future costs as shown in Eq. (4.5). The number of times the selected wall will 
need to be replaced is calculated by rounding up the integer value of the anticipated site 
lifespan (LS) divided by the design life of the selected blast wall (DL) minus the initial 
wall construction, as shown in Eq. (4.5). For example, if a blast wall has a design life of 
six years and the anticipated site lifespan is twenty years, the blast wall will need to be 
replaced three times after the lifespan of the first constructed wall (20 divided by 6 – 1 = 
2.33, rounded up to 3). The wall replacement unit cost is the cost to remove and 
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reconstruct a linear meter of the selected blast wall based upon the wall type (T) and 
wall height (H).  
 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑆𝐶𝐶 = 𝐼𝐶𝐶 + 𝑊𝑅𝐶 (4.3) 
 
𝐼𝐶𝐶 = 𝑃𝐿𝑊𝐿×𝑊𝐶𝑇,𝐻 + ∑ 𝐹𝐴𝑖×𝐹𝐶𝑀
𝐼
𝑖=1
 (4.4) 
 
𝑊𝑅𝐶 = 𝐷 (𝑃𝐿𝑊𝐿× ⌈
𝐿𝑆
𝐷𝐿𝑇,𝐻
− 1⌉ ×𝑊𝑅𝑇,𝐻) (4.5) 
where, 
𝑆𝐶𝐶 = site construction cost ($);  
 𝐼𝐶𝐶 = initial construction cost ($); 
𝑊𝑅𝐶 = present value of future replacement costs of the perimeter wall 
($); 
𝑃𝐿𝑊𝐿 = perimeter wall length (m) based upon the selected option for wall 
location (WL);  
𝑊𝐶𝑇,𝐻 = wall construction unit cost based upon the selected wall type (T) 
and wall height (H) ($/m); 
𝐹𝐴𝑖 = area of facility i (m
2); 
𝐹𝐶𝑀 = facility construction unit cost based upon the selected building 
material (M) ($/m2); 
𝐷 = discount rate to calculate the present value of future costs (%); 
𝐿𝑆 = expected site lifespan (years); 
𝐷𝐿𝑇,𝐻 = design life of selected blast wall based upon the wall type (T) and 
wall height (H) (years); and 
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𝑊𝑅𝑇,𝐻 = wall replacement unit cost based upon the selected wall type (T) 
and wall height (H) ($/m). 
 Model Constraints 
The present model was designed to comply with all practical constraints that can 
be encountered in the planning of remote construction sites, including: (1) site 
boundary; (2) facility overlap; (3) minimum distance; and (4) maximum distance. These 
constraints, as shown in Figure 4.4, ensure model efficacy and enhance model 
performance by incorporating planner preferences. Each of the constraint types is 
briefly discussed below.  
Site boundary and facility overlap constraints are mandatory to ensure the 
feasibility of generated solutions by avoiding spatial conflicts (El-Rayes and Said 2009; 
Zouein and Tommelein 1999). The first constraint type, site boundary, is employed to 
guarantee that all facilities are positioned within the selected site perimeter, as shown in 
Figure 4.4a. Boundary constraints are analyzed using automated computational 
geometry to calculate the area of each facility outside the site perimeter. The boundary 
constraint is violated when the calculated area of a facility outside the site perimeter is 
greater than zero. The second constraint type, facility overlap, is utilized to ensure that 
proposed facility locations do not overlap one another. Facility overlap constraints are 
tested by calculating the intersection area between each pair of proposed facility 
locations on the site. The facility overlap constraint is violated when the calculated 
intersection area between a pair of facilities is greater than zero. In Figure 4.4a, facility 1 
violates the site boundary constraint but complies with the facility overlap constraint, 
while facilities 2 and 3 comply with the site boundary constraint but violate the facility 
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overlap constraint, and facility 4 complies with both the site boundary and facility 
overlap constraints.  
Minimum and maximum distance constraints are incorporated into the present 
model to enforce compliance with security and safety requirements and to enable 
planners to integrate design preferences, as shown in Figure 4.4b. The third constraint 
of minimum distance establishes a buffer area around facilities in which other facilities 
cannot be constructed. For example, minimum separation distances between facilities 
may be required to allow for emergency vehicle access. Another example of this 
constraint is a specified minimum separation distance between hazardous materials 
(HAZMAT) storage areas and housing buildings. The fourth constraint of maximum 
distance establishes a buffer area around facilities in which other facilities must be 
located. For example, maximum distance constraints may be established to limit the 
walking distance of senior decision makers to the headquarters (HQ) office building in 
case of a rapid response scenario. Both minimum and maximum distance constraints 
are evaluated similarly to the aforementioned facility overlap constraints, where the 
intersection area between each pair of facilities is calculated; however, a buffer equal to 
the required minimum/maximum distance is added to the facility dimensions. The 
minimum distance constraint is violated when the calculated intersection area between 
a pair of facilities and their minimum separation distance is greater than zero. The 
maximum distance constraint is violated when the calculated intersection area is equal 
to zero. For example, there is a minimum separation distance from facility 1 in the layout 
in Figure 4.4b and therefore, facility 2 violates this constraint while facilities 3 and 4 
comply with this constraint. Similarly, there is a maximum distance constraint imposed 
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around facility 1 in Figure 4.4b and accordingly both facilities 2 and 3 violate this 
constraint.  
 
Figure 4.4 Model Constraints: (a) Boundary and Overlap; (b) Minimum/Maximum 
Distance 
 
4.3 Model Implementation 
In order to support planners in their critical task of analyzing optimal tradeoffs 
between minimizing facility destruction levels from explosive attacks and minimizing site 
construction costs, the present model is implemented as a multi-objective genetic 
algorithm (MOGA). MOGA was selected to perform the model computations because of 
its proven capabilities in: (1) modeling non-linear objective functions and constraints; (2) 
identifying near optimal solutions within a practical computational time; and (3) 
successfully modeling previous facility layout and construction optimization problems 
(Said and El-Rayes 2010; Mawdesley et al. 2002; Elbeltagi et al. 2004; Khalafallah and 
  
 
106 
El-Rayes 2011). The present model was implemented utilizing the nondominated 
sorting genetic algorithm II (NSGA-II) (Deb et al. 2002) and executed with the 
Distributed Evolutionary Algorithms toolbox (Fortin et al. 2012) for Python (Rossum 
1995). The model was implemented in four main steps: (1) data input; (2) initialization 
(3) fitness evaluation; and (4) data output, as shown in Figure 4.5 and described below.  
In the first implementation step, planners need to provide two sets of input data 
that specify: (1) all required site layout and security measure data; and (2) MOGA 
search parameters. The first set of input data includes: (a) feasible blast walls 
characteristics including perimeter location, type, height, and design life; (b) available 
building materials; (c) blast wall and building material cost data; (d) facility geometries; 
(e) facility importance weights; (f) site lifespan; and (g) blast charge weight. The second 
set of input data specifies the required MOGA search parameters, including: (a) 
population size (P); (b) number of generations (G); (c) mutation rate (pm); and (d) 
crossover rate (pc).  
The second implementation step initiates the search process by: (1) reading in 
the specified MOGA parameters; and (2) randomly generating an initial set of solutions 
(s = 1 to S) that forms the initial population (P1) of the first generation (g = 1). This set of 
solutions represents feasible alternatives of facility layout, blast wall, and building 
material decisions.  
The third implementation step evaluates the fitness of the generated solutions by: 
(1) calculating the site destruction index (SDI) based upon the facility layout and 
selected security measures for each solution (s) in generation (g); (2) calculating the 
site construction cost (SCC) of each solution (s) in generation (g) based upon the 
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selected blast wall and building materials; (3) computing a site penalty score for each 
solution (s) based upon the percent area of site facilities that violate specified geometric 
constraints; (4) selecting the fittest individuals within the population; and (5) utilizing 
selection, crossover, and mutation operators in order to generate a new offspring 
population (g = g+1). This five-step process is repeated until the specified number of 
generations (g = G) has been reached.  
In the fourth implementation step, the model can be used to generate and 
visualize the optimization output data. This enables planners to: (1) produce a database 
of the generated optimal tradeoff solutions between the objectives of minimizing SDI 
and minimizing SCC; (2) graphically represent the tradeoff curves of the nondominated 
Pareto frontier solutions, as shown in Figure 4.5; and (3) generate visualizations of the 
optimal site layout plans using matplotlib (Hunter 2007) (Figure 4.5). The output data 
and visualizations enable planners to analyze and select the optimal facility layout and 
selection of security measures based upon their required level of facility protection or 
available construction budget. 
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Figure 4.5 Model Implementation 
4.4 Performance Evaluation 
This stage analyzes an application example to evaluate the performance of the 
developed model and demonstrate its distinctive capabilities in optimizing remote 
construction site layouts and generating optimal tradeoffs between minimizing facility 
destruction levels from explosive attacks and minimizing site construction costs. The 
application example represents a hypothetical military forward operating base designed 
to house and support the operations of 75 personnel. In this example, the base is 
assumed to be: (1) located in a remote area in an overseas country with a construction 
area cost factor of 1.67 (USACE 2016); (2) positioned in an available site area of 90 
meters by 60 meters; and (3) comprised of one-story facilities with a three-meter 
minimum separation distance between all facilities.  
  
 
109 
The application example requires the construction of ten facilities to house and 
support the operations of the military base, including a headquarters office facility, 
dormitories, a senior officer dormitory, a dining facility, a gymnasium, a maintenance 
facility, and a storage facility. In order to perform the optimization of this application 
example, planners need to specify the input data discussed in the model 
implementation phase, including the: (1) characteristics of feasible perimeter blast wall 
types, as shown in Table 4.1; (2) available facility building materials, as shown in Table 
4.2; (3) estimated construction costs of blast walls and building materials, as well as 
replacement costs of blast walls, as shown in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2; (4) dimensions 
of each site facility (Lx, Ly), as shown in Table 4.3; (5) importance weight assigned to 
each site facility, as shown in Table 4.3; (6) expected operational lifespan of twenty 
years; and (7) anticipated maximum explosive threat of 454.5 kg (1,000 lb) based upon 
local intelligence, which is the design blast charge weight carried in a full-size van 
(FEMA 2011). This application example subjects the base to uniformly distributed 
threats from all four sides of the perimeter wall. It should be noted that the facility 
importance weights in Table 4.3 are assigned for the purpose of analyzing this 
application example and that the model provides the flexibility to assign priority to 
facilities based on their criticality to the mission and the purpose of the remote 
construction site.  
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Table 4.1 Characteristics of Available Blast Walls  
ID Wall type (WT) 
Wall height 
H (m) 
Construction Costa 
𝑊𝐶𝑇,𝐻 ($/m) 
Replacement Costa 
𝑊𝑅𝑇,𝐻($/m) 
Design Life  
DLT,H (years) 
1 Balsa wood, thick 2 544 816 20 
2 Balsa wood, thick 5 1,361 2,042 20 
3 Balsa wood, thin 2 436 654 20 
4 Balsa wood, thin 5 1,089 1,634 20 
5 CMU 2 438 657 10 
6 CMU 5 1,094 1,641 10 
7 Concrete, thin panel 2 431 647 15 
8 Concrete, thin panel 5 1,077 1,616 15 
9 Polystyrene 2 640 960 10 
10 Polystyrene 5 1,598 2,397 10 
11 Polythene sheet 2 561 842 10 
12 Polythene sheet 5 1,402 2,103 10 
13 Revetting material 2 601 902 10 
14 Revetting material 5 1,501 2,252 10 
15 Sand, thick 2 524 786 4 
16 Sand, thick 5 624 936 4 
17 Sand, medium 2 339 509 4 
18 Sand, medium 5 458 687 4 
19 Sand, thin 2 267 401 4 
20 Sand, thin 5 386 579 4 
21 Steel 2 1,015 1,523 20 
22  Steel 5 2,537 3,806 20 
23 Water, bag 2 752 1,128 7 
24 Water, bag 5 1,002 1,503 7 
25 Water, filled 2 534 801 7 
26 Water, filled 5 668 1,002 7 
aCosts were determined from the 2017 RS Means, when available, or Army Corps of Engineers subject 
matter experts 
 
Table 4.2 Building Material Options and Construction Costs 
ID Building Material 
Construction Cost 
𝐹𝐶𝑀 ($/m2) 
1 Wood frame 3,090 
2 Pre-engineered metal 3,150 
3 Unreinforced masonry 3,300 
4 Steel frame with lightly reinforced CMU infill walls 3,380 
5 Reinforced concrete 3,560 
6 Reinforced concrete with lightly reinforced CMU infill walls 4,400 
aCosts were determined from the 2017 RS Means, when available, or Army Corps of Engineers subject 
matter experts 
 
 
 
 
  
 
111 
Table 4.3 Site Facilities, Dimensions, and Importance Weights 
  Dimensions  
ID Description Lx (m) Ly (m) wi 
F1 Dormitory 12 9 0.05 
F2 Dormitory  12 9 0.05 
F3 Dormitory 12 9 0.05 
F4 Dormitory 12 9 0.05 
F5 Dining Facility 12 9 0.2 
F6 Gymnasium 12 9 0.05 
F7 Headquarters  12 6 0.3 
F8 Senior Officer Dormitory  12 9 0.2 
F9 Storage  15 9 0.02 
F10 Maintenance  12 6 0.03 
 
The developed optimization model was used to search for and identify optimal 
site layout and security decisions for this remotely located base. The optimization model 
utilizes the aforementioned multi-objective genetic algorithm (MOGA) computations. 
The optimal MOGA search parameters were identified for this application example 
based on a large number of experiments that evaluated a wide range of population 
sizes, number of generations, mutation rates, crossover rates, and crossover types as 
shown in Table 4.4. Accordingly, these MOGA parameters were specified for this 
application example to be a population size of 150, 600 generations, a mutation rate of 
0.01, and two-point crossover with a crossover rate of 0.50. 
Table 4.4 MOGA Search Parameter Experiments 
ID Population Generations Mutation rate Crossover rate Crossover Type 
1 50 150 0.001 0.10 one-point 
2 50 150 0.001 0.10 two-point 
3 50 150 0.001 0.25 one-point 
4 50 150 0.001 0.25 two-point 
5 50 150 0.001 0.50 one-point 
6 50 150 0.001 0.50 two-point 
7 50 150 0.001 0.75 one-point 
8 50 150 0.001 0.75 two-point 
9 50 150 0.001 0.90 one-point 
10 50 150 0.001 0.90 two-point 
11 50 150 0.002 0.10 two-point 
12 50 150 0.002 0.25 two-point 
13 50 150 0.002 0.50 two-point 
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Table 4.4 (cont.) 
14 50 150 0.002 0.75 two-point 
15 50 150 0.002 0.90 two-point 
16 50 150 0.005 0.10 two-point 
17 50 150 0.005 0.25 two-point 
18 50 150 0.005 0.50 two-point 
19 50 150 0.005 0.75 two-point 
20 50 150 0.005 0.90 two-point 
21 50 150 0.010 0.10 two-point 
22  50 150 0.010 0.25 two-point 
23 50 150 0.010 0.50 two-point 
24 50 150 0.010 0.75 two-point 
25 50 150 0.010 0.90 two-point 
26 150 150 0.010 0.50 two-point 
27 300 150 0.010 0.50 two-point 
28 600 150 0.010 0.50 two-point 
29 150 300 0.010 0.50 two-point 
30 300 300 0.010 0.50 two-point 
31a 150 600 0.010 0.50 two-point 
32 150 1,500 0.010 0.50 two-point 
aProvided the best combination of performance and computational time 
The search space for this application example includes more than 17.5 million 
unique combinations of facility layout and security decisions, which represents the 
product of multiplying the total number of all feasible alternatives for the aforementioned 
six decision variable types. Each of these 17.5 million possible combinations represents 
varying performance in the aforementioned objectives of minimizing SDI and minimizing 
SCC. The developed optimization model, performed using MOGA, was used to perform 
an efficient and effective search of this large search space of feasible design 
alternatives in order to identify near-optimal solutions. The model generated a broad 
spectrum of 72 Pareto-optimal (i.e. nondominated) solutions that represent a unique 
and optimal tradeoff between the two optimization objectives. The generated Pareto-
optimal solutions result in expected damage levels ranging from 14% to 68% and site 
construction costs between $5.25 million and $3.41 million, respectively, as shown in 
Figure 4.6.  
  
 
113 
 
Figure 4.6 Generated Pareto-optimal Solutions 
On one end of the spectrum, solution S1 represents the generated Pareto-
optimal solution that results in the lowest overall level of site destruction (14%). This 
minimum SDI was achieved by: (1) utilizing the layout shown in Figure 4.7a, where the 
standoff distances between the facilities and site perimeter are as large as possible and 
the facilities with the highest importance weights (wi) are placed near the center of the 
site; (2) constructing the most blast-resistant perimeter wall, a five-meter tall, thick sand 
blast wall; and (3) constructing all facilities from steel frame or reinforced concrete with 
lightly reinforced CMU infill walls, which provide the highest levels of blast-resistance. 
This solution, however, is the most expensive, with a site construction cost of $5.25 
million. 
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Figure 4.7 Site Layout Plan for Solutions (a) S1 and (b) S72 
At the other end of the spectrum, solution S72 represents the generated Pareto-
optimal solution that results in the lowest site construction cost ($3.41 million). This 
minimum SCC was achieved by: (1) employing the site layout shown in Figure 4.7b; (2) 
building a two-meter tall, thin, balsa wood blast wall; and (3) selecting wood-frame 
construction for all ten buildings. While this solution does result in the lowest site 
construction cost, planners face an extremely high expected site damage level of 68% 
in the event of a 454.5 kg explosive attack. The similarity between the site layouts of 
solutions S1 and S72 clearly illustrate that increasing standoff distance by locating all 
facilities towards the center of the site layout has a significant impact on minimizing the 
potential effects of an explosive attack with little or no additional cost. To achieve further 
reduction in site destruction levels, solution S1 selects more costly alternatives for the 
perimeter blast wall and building materials, which provides additional protection at an 
increased cost.   
Between the two ends of the spectrum, the model generated 70 other Pareto-
optimal solutions that enable planners to analyze and select the design that best meets 
their unique project requirements based upon: (1) maximum acceptable level of site 
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destruction; (2) maximum available construction budget; and/or (3) minimizing site 
destruction levels with the least additional cost. For example, solution S34 represents 
the solution that costs the least amount of money to construct a site ($4.18 million) 
where the expected level of destruction does not exceed 25%. Likewise, solution S42 
represents the solution that results in the lowest level of site destruction (31%) while 
complying with a maximum available construction budget of $4.00 million (see Figure 
4.7). Similarly, solution S18 represents the solution that results in a site destruction level 
of 17%, which is near the lowest overall level of site destruction identified in solution S1 
(14%), but is achieved at a substantially reduced cost of $4.46 million compared to 
$5.25 million for solution S1. Table 4.5 provides a sample of the optimal decision 
variable solutions for the solutions discussed in this section.  
Table 4.5 Sample Optimization Results 
  Building Material   
Solution 
Blast 
Wall 
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 
SDI 
(%) 
SCC 
($M) 
S1 8 4 4 4 4 6 4 6 6 4 4 14 5.25 
S18 20 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 17 4.46 
S34 22 4 1 4 1 4 1 4 4 1 4 25 4.18 
S42 21 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 31 4.00 
S72 29 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 68 3.41 
 
4.5 Summary and Conclusions  
A novel multi-objective optimization model was developed to identify optimal site 
layout and security decisions for remote construction sites. The model provides the 
capability of generating optimal tradeoffs between the two main objectives of minimizing 
facility destruction levels from explosive attacks and minimizing site construction costs. 
The model was developed in three main stages: (1) formulation stage that defined the 
relevant decision variables, formulated the objective functions and identified practical 
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model constraints; (2) implementation stage that performed the optimization 
computations using multi-objective genetic algorithm; and (3) performance evaluation 
stage that analyzed an application example to evaluate model performance. The 
application example optimized the design and construction decisions to protect a 
hypothetical remote military base against the identified threat of a 454.5 kg (1,000 lb) 
explosive attack. The results of this analysis demonstrated the model’s distinctive 
capabilities in optimizing construction site layout and security decisions by generating 
72 Pareto-optimal solutions that represent unique optimal tradeoffs between minimizing 
facility destruction levels from explosive attacks and minimizing site construction costs.  
The primary contribution this research makes to the body of knowledge is the 
development of a novel model that is uniquely capable of: (a) optimizing both the site 
layout planning and selection of perimeter blast walls and building materials; and (b) 
generating optimal tradeoffs between minimizing facility destruction levels from 
explosive attacks and minimizing site construction costs. The developed model should 
prove useful for planners of high-threat, remote sites, enabling them to efficiently and 
effectively evaluate all feasible design alternatives. This capability results in the 
construction of cost-effective, high-performance sites that will lower the risks to site 
personnel and facilities from the devastating effects of an explosive attack. 
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BLAST CONSEQUENCE MITIGATION MODEL 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the development of a novel multi-objective optimization 
model for the layout and security planning of remote construction sites that provides the 
capability of minimizing the consequences of an explosive attack and minimizing the 
construction cost of remote sites. Designers and site layout planners of remote sites 
often have limited construction budgets and confined site layout spaces with which to 
meet the mission requirements of the site and provide maximum security to site 
personnel and facilities. The model is intended to support designers in their critical task 
of searching for and identifying optimal remote construction site layouts in order to 
construct remote sites that minimize the personnel loss, psychological impact, economic 
loss, and operational impact in the event of an explosive attack while minimizing site 
construction costs. The model is developed in three main stages: (1) consequence 
identification stage that quantifies the consequences of explosive attacks targeting 
facilities; (2) formulation stage that identifies the relevant decision variables, formulates 
the objective functions, and defines all practical constraints; and (3) implementation 
stage that performs the optimization computations using genetic algorithm and specifies 
the model input and output data, as shown in Figure 5.1. The performance of the 
developed model is analyzed using a case study that is designed to illustrate the use of 
the model and demonstrate its unique capabilities. The following sections describe 
these three development stages. 
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Figure 5.1. Optimization Model Development Stages 
5.2 Consequence Identification 
This stage of model development is designed to quantify the consequences of 
explosive attacks on remote construction sites. These consequences are identified and 
organized in the present model using a similar approach to the one adopted by the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Accordingly, the present model 
quantifies four main consequences of explosive attacks: (1) personnel loss (PL); (2) 
psychological impact (PI); (3) economic loss (EL); and (4) operational impact (OI).  
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 Personnel Loss (PL) 
Personnel loss (PL) is designed to measure and minimize the extent of fatalities 
and injuries inflicted on occupants of a remote site from an explosive attack. The overall 
PL is presented as the site personnel loss equivalence (PLEsite), which is a measure of 
the total equivalent number of fatalities and is defined as the weighted sum of three 
personnel loss types: fatalities (PF), serious injuries (PSI), and minor injuries (PMI), as 
shown in Eq. (5.1). The use of weights (wPL) provides designers with the capability and 
flexibility to consider varying user-specified weights to represent the relative impact of 
these three personnel losses types (wF, wSI, wMI), which differs from one decision maker 
to another. For example, the model utilizes default weights of 1.0, 0.7 and 0.085 for 
fatalities, serious injuries and minor injuries, respectively, based on the reported 
compensations provided for these three personnel loss types after the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks (Dixon and Stern 2004).  
 𝑃𝐿𝐸𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒 = ⌈P
𝐹×𝑤𝐹 + P𝑆𝐼×𝑤𝑆𝐼 + P𝑀𝐼×𝑤𝑀𝐼⌉ (5.1) 
where,  
𝑃𝐿𝐸𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒 = equivalent number of personnel fatalities on site; 
𝑃𝐹, P𝑆𝐼, P𝑀𝐼 = number of personnel expected to suffer fatalities, serious injuries 
and minor injuries, respectively; and 
𝑤𝐹, w𝑆𝐼, w𝑀𝐼 = importance weight for fatalities, serious injuries and minor 
injuries, respectively, where 0 ≤ 𝑤𝑃𝐿 ≤ 1. 
Each of the aforementioned personnel loss types: fatalities (PF), serious injuries 
(PSI), and minor injuries (PMI) is calculated in two main steps that are designed to 
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compute: (1) the percent area of each facility within specified damage levels; and (2) the 
number of personnel expected to suffer fatalities, serious injuries and minor injuries.   
 The first step is designed to compute the percent area of each facility that is 
subjected to either minimal, minor, moderate, heavy, or severe damage levels (PFA i,j) 
resulting from an explosive attack, as shown in Figure 5.2. The computations in this 
step are performed using a recently developed model for quantifying blast effects on 
facilities behind blast walls (Schuldt and El-Rayes 2017). The area of the 
aforementioned five damage levels are represented as concentric rings, centered at the 
blast location, with radii equal to the standoff distance at which each facility damage 
level occurs.  
 
Figure 5.2 Percent facility area within each damage level (PFAi,j) 
The second step computes the total number of personnel expected to suffer 
fatalities, serious injuries and minor injuries in all facilities on site. Each of these 
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personnel loss types is calculated as the product of multiplying the percent facility area 
within each damage level (PFAi,j), the assigned facility population (Popi), and the ratio of 
the facility population expected to suffer each personnel loss type within each facility 
damage level (𝑅𝑗
𝑃𝐿). For example, Eq. (5.2) illustrates the computations of the total 
number of fatalities in all facilities on site. Similarly, the total number of serious injuries 
and minor injuries in the entire site are calculated using similar equations to Eq. (5.2). 
These computations are based on two assumptions: (1) the assigned Popi is assumed 
to be uniformly distributed within each facility and is calculated based on the prorated 
amount of time individuals occupy a facility each day; and (2) 𝑅𝑗
𝑃𝐿 represents the upper 
limit of reported ranges of injury levels as identified in existing design manuals (DoD 
2012; USACE 1999), as shown in Figure 5.3.  
 
𝑃𝐹 = ∑ ∑ 𝑃𝐹𝐴𝑖,𝑗×𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖×𝑅𝑗
𝐹
5
𝑗=1
𝐼
𝑖=1
 (5.2) 
where,  
i  = facility number; 
I  = total number of facilities on site; 
j = facility damage level, where j = 1,2,3,4,5 represents minimal, 
minor, moderate, heavy, and severe damage, respectively; 
𝑃𝐹𝐴𝑖,𝑗 = percent facility area (i) that suffers damage level (j);  
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖 = number of personnel assigned to facility i; and 
𝑅𝑗
𝐹 = ratio of personnel expected to suffer fatalities per damage level 
(j). 
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Figure 5.3 Ratio of personnel expected to suffer injury levels within each facility 
damage level (𝑹𝒋
𝑷𝑳) 
 Psychological Impact Index 
Psychological impact (PI) is designed to evaluate and minimize the degree of 
emotional and psychological disorders suffered by the survivors of explosive attacks on 
remote sites. Accordingly, the present study quantifies PI by the prevalence of post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among survivors because PTSD is the most studied, 
best-defined, and one of the most frequent and debilitating psychological disorders 
experienced in the aftermath of explosive attacks (Butler et al. 2003; Gabriel et al. 2007; 
Neria et al. 2008).  
Psychological impact is calculated as the total number of personnel expected to 
suffer PTSD on the site (PIsite). The rate that survivors of explosive attacks experience 
PTSD is reported to vary by personnel degree of exposure. Specifically, the prevalence 
of PTSD among personnel injured in an explosive attack is reported to range from 30-
40%, while the reported PTSD rate of uninjured personnel is between 5% and 10% 
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(Neria et al. 2008). To consider the most critical design cases, the present model 
utilizes the upper limit of these reported ranges (40% and 10%) to define the expected 
PTSD rates for injured (𝑃𝐼) and uninjured (𝑃𝑈) survivors, as shown in Eq. (5.3). The 
number of injured personnel is calculated using Eq. (5.4) and the number of uninjured 
personnel is equal to the site population (Popsite) minus the number of personnel 
fatalities and injured personnel, as shown in Eq. (5.5).  
 𝑃𝐼𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒 = ⌈0.4×𝑃
𝐼 + 0.1×𝑃𝑈⌉ (5.3) 
 𝑃𝐼 = 𝑃𝑆𝐼 + 𝑃𝑀𝐼 (5.4) 
 𝑃𝑈 = 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒 − (𝑃
𝐹 + 𝑃𝐼) (5.5) 
where,  
𝑃𝐼𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒 = number of site personnel expected to be diagnosed with PTSD; 
𝑃𝐼 = number of injured personnel on site;  
𝑃𝑈 = number of uninjured personnel on site; and 
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒 = total site population. 
 Economic Loss Index 
Economic loss (EL) is designed to assess and minimize the total economic loss 
inflicted on a site by an explosive attack. The overall EL represents the site total 
economic loss (TELsite) that consists of: (a) the sum of all facility direct losses (𝐷𝐿𝑖), 
including damages to facilities and assets, and (b) facility indirect losses (𝐼𝐿𝑖) resulting 
from facility interruptions that degrade the capability of the site to provide goods and 
services (Pelling et al. 2002), as shown in Eq. (5.10). TELsite is computed in four main 
steps that are designed to calculate: (1) the total percent destruction of each facility; (2) 
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the direct losses for each facility; (3) the indirect losses for each facility; (4) site total 
economic loss.  
The first step is designed to calculate the percent destruction inflicted on each 
facility from an explosive attack (PFDi). The quantification of these percent facility 
destruction values are performed using the aforementioned model for quantifying blast 
effects on facilities behind blast walls (Schuldt and El-Rayes 2017). The second step is 
to calculate the direct losses for each facility. Direct losses consist of both facility 
reconstruction costs (FRCi) and asset replacement costs (ARCi), as shown in Eq. (5.6). 
First, FRCi is calculated using the 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑖, facility reconstruction unit cost (𝐹𝑅𝑀), which is 
the cost to reconstruct a square meter of the selected building material (M), and the 
facility area (𝐹𝐴𝑖). When the PFDi is low, building owners usually prefer to repair the 
damaged facility, as shown in Eq. (5.7). When the cost of repairing the damaged facility 
exceeds a certain percentage of the replacement cost, building owners typically decide 
to replace the damaged facility instead of repairing it. The present model utilizes FEMA 
P-58’s recommendation to reconstruct a facility when it suffers more than 40% damage 
(FEMA 2012), as shown in Eq. (5.7). Second, ARCi is the cost to replace the assets 
within a facility that are destroyed or damaged by an explosive attack. ARCi is 
calculated as the product of multiplying the total value of assets within a facility (FAVi) 
and its percent facility destruction (𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑖), where the assets are assumed to be uniformly 
distributed within the facility, as shown in Eq. (5.8). 
 𝐷𝐿𝑖 = 𝐹𝑅𝐶𝑖 + 𝐴𝑅𝐶𝑖 (5.6) 
   𝐹𝑅𝐶𝑖 = 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑖×𝐹𝑅𝑀×𝐹𝐴𝑖      for 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑖 < 0.40 
 𝐹𝑅𝐶𝑖 = 𝐹𝑅𝑀×𝐹𝐴𝑖                 for 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑖 ≥ 0.40 
(5.7) 
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 𝐴𝑅𝐶𝑖 = 𝐹𝐴𝑉𝑖×𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑖 (5.8) 
where, 
𝐷𝐿𝑖 = direct losses for facility i ($);  
𝐹𝑅𝐶𝑖  = facility reconstruction cost for facility i ($); 
𝐴𝑅𝐶𝑖 = cost to replace destroyed assets in facility i ($);  
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑖 = total percentage of destruction to facility i; 
𝐹𝑅𝑀 = facility reconstruction unit cost based upon the selected building 
material (M) ($/m2); 
𝐹𝐴𝑖 = area of facility i (m
2); and 
𝐹𝐴𝑉𝑖 = total value of assets within facility i ($). 
The third step is to calculate the indirect losses for each facility ( 𝐼𝐿𝑖 ). ILi is 
calculated as the product of facility downtime (𝐹𝐷𝑖) and facility productivity rate (𝐹𝑃𝑅𝑖), 
as shown in Eq. (5.9). The downtime of a facility following an explosive attack includes 
the time necessary to plan, design, finance, and complete the required repairs on the 
damaged facility. As show in Table 5.1, this facility downtime (𝐹𝐷𝑖) is identified in the 
present model based on the percent facility destruction (𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑖) and the required repair 
time for different categories of repair that were reported by Comerio (2006). The fourth 
step computes the total economic loss for the entire site by summating the direct losses 
and indirect losses for all facilities on site, as shown in Eq. (5.10). 
 𝐼𝐿𝑖 = 𝐹𝐷𝑖×𝐹𝑃𝑅𝑖 (5.9) 
 
𝑇𝐸𝐿𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒 = ∑(𝐷𝐿𝑖 + 𝐼𝐿𝑖)
𝐼
𝑖=1
 (5.10) 
where,  
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𝐼𝐿𝑖  = indirect losses for facility i ($); 
𝐹𝐷𝑖 = downtime of facility i (months); and 
𝐹𝑃𝑅𝑖 = productivity rate for facility i ($/month).  
 
Table 5.1 Facility Downtime Based on Facility Damage Level  
Percent Facility 
Destruction (PFDi) Repair Category 
Repair Timea 
(𝐹𝐷𝑖) (months) 
< 5% Minimal Effort N/A 
5-10% Cleanup 0.25 
10-20% Minor Repair 2 
20-30% Moderate Repair 4 
30-40% Major Repair 20 
> 40% Replacement 36 
a Reported repair time for facilities with an area less than 7,500 m2 (Comerio 2006) 
 Operational Impact Index 
Operational impact (OI) is designed to measure and minimize the reduction in 
site operational capacity due to the downtime of critical facilities damaged by an 
explosive attack. This impact is represented in the model using the site total operational 
impact (TOIsite), which is a measure of the total number of days the site will be unable to 
perform its primary mission. TOIsite is calculated in four steps that are designed to 
compute the: (1) mission dependency index of each facility; (2) effective mission 
dependency index based on facility destruction level; (3) site daily mission disruption; 
and (4) site total operational impact. 
The first step is designed to compute the mission dependency index of each 
facility (MDIi) using the standard measure of infrastructure criticality adopted by the 
United States Department of Defense (Antelman et al. 2008; Grussing et al. 2010). MDIi 
is measured on a normalized scale of 0% to 100% that represents the percentage 
degradation in the overall site operations if the facility is unable to perform its primary 
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function. MDIi is calculated using Eq. (5.11) (Grussing et al. 2010), where mission intra- 
and interdependency scores (MDW and MDB, respectively) are assigned from a scoring 
matrix based upon designers’ answers to questions designed to assess the: (a) length 
of time a facility can be inoperable before having an adverse impact on the site mission; 
(b) ability of another facility to perform the mission of the damaged facility; and (c) 
difficulty to replace the services provided by the damaged facility (Grussing et al. 2010).  
The second step calculates the effective mission disruption index of each facility 
(EMDIi) based on the total percentage of destruction to facility i (PFDi), as shown in Eq. 
(5.12). MDIi is incapable of quantifying the level of operational degradation when the 
facility suffers partial damage because it assumes the facility is completely destroyed or 
out of service. Accordingly, EMDIi accounts for the actual degradation of operational 
capacity based on the destruction level of each facility by multiplying the MDIi by the 
PFDi. For example, if a facility has an MDI value of 75% and is 100% damaged, the 
overall site operational capacity will be degraded 75%. If the same facility is only 10% 
damaged, the overall site operational capacity will only be degraded 7.5%.  
The third step calculates the overall daily mission disruption (DMDt) for each day 
(t) that site facilities are unable to perform their primary functions, as shown in Eq. 
(5.13). DMDt is calculated by summing up the EMDIi for all damaged facilities on day t 
while considering: (a) the time needed to restore each facility to its full operational 
capacity (TROi); and (b) that DMDt at any given day t should not exceed 100%, which 
represents complete disruption of site operations on that day. TROi is a user input that 
varies based upon the local conditions of the remote site and the availability of contract 
support to construct temporary facilities to restore functionality while long-term repairs 
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are conducted to repair damaged facilities. The fourth step calculates the site total 
operational impact (TOIsite) by summing the site DMDt values for each day until all 
facilities are returned to full operational capacity (TROsite+1), as shown in Eq. (5.14). 
Therefore, the TOIsite represents the total number of days the site will be unable to 
perform its primary mission.  
 𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑖 = 𝑀𝐷𝑊× (1 + (𝑀𝐷𝐵,𝑎𝑣𝑔 + 𝑙𝑛(𝑛)) /100) (5.11) 
 𝐸𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑖 = 𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑖×𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑖 (5.12) 
 𝐷𝑀𝐷𝑡 = ∑ 𝐸𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡
𝐼
𝑖=1        for ∑ 𝐸𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡
𝐼
𝑖=1 < 100% 
𝐷𝑀𝐷𝑡 = 100%                 for ∑ 𝐸𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡
𝐼
𝑖=1 ≥ 100% 
(5.13) 
 
𝑇𝑂𝐼𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒 = ∑ 𝐷𝑀𝐷𝑡
𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒+1
𝑡=1
 (5.14) 
where, 
𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑖 = mission dependency index value for facility i (0% to 100%); 
𝑀𝐷𝑤 = measure of mission intra-dependency;  
𝑀𝐷𝐵,𝑎𝑣𝑔 = average measure of mission interdependency;  
𝑛 = number of interdependencies with other function areas on site; 
𝐸𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑖 = effective mission dependency index value for facility i (0% to 
100%); 
𝐷𝑀𝐷𝑡 = the overall site daily mission disruption on day (t);  
t = day number; 
𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒 = time to restore all site facilities to full operational capacity; and 
𝑇𝑂𝐼𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒 = total site operational impact (number of operational days lost).  
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The calculation of TOIsite can be illustrated using a simplified example of a site 
consisting of five facilities with MDIi, PFDi, EMDi, and TROi values as shown in Table 
5.2. On day one, all five facilities are damaged and DMDt=1 is calculated as 150% using 
Eq. (5.13). As shown in Figure 5.4, DMDt is capped at 100% to reflect the complete 
degradation of operational capacity on a given day. On day two, facility F3 has been 
restored to full operational capacity and DMDt=2 is equal to 112% and capped at 100%. 
On day three, facilities F3 and F1 have been restored to full operational capacity and 
the site DMDt=3 is now 81%, meaning that the site is operating at 19% its full operational 
capacity. DMDt=4 and DMDt=5 are calculated in the same manner and are equal to 56% 
and 24%, respectively. The site is restored to full operational capacity on day six. TOIsite 
is then calculated by summing the DMDt values from day one to day six (TROsite+1) and 
is equal to 3.57 days, which represents the total number of days the site will be unable 
to perform its primary mission. 
Table 5.2 Daily Mission Disruption Example 
ID 
Mission dependency 
index (MDII)  
(%) 
Percent facility 
destruction (PFDi)  
(%) 
Effective mission 
disruption index 
(EMDIi)  
(%) 
Time to restore 
full operational 
capacity (TROi) 
(days) 
F1 80 25 20 2 
F2 60 60 36 3 
F3 50 75 38 1 
F4 40 80 32 4 
F5 30 80 24 5 
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Figure 5.4 Daily Mission Disruption Example Calculations 
5.3 Model Formulation 
This stage focuses on formulating a multi-objective optimization model that is 
capable of optimizing the site layout and protection strategies in order to minimize the 
explosive attack consequences (EC) and minimize the site construction costs (CC) of 
remote sites. The model is formulated in three steps that focus on: (1) identifying the 
relevant decision variables, (2) defining the objective functions, and (3) specifying all 
practical constraints. 
 Decision Variables 
The decision variables in the present model are selected to represent all relevant 
site layout and protection strategy decisions that have an impact on the aforementioned 
optimization objectives. Accordingly, the model incorporates these decision variables 
into two main categories: (1) site layout decision variables, and (2) protection strategy 
decisions variables, as shown in Figure 5.5. Site layout decision variables include the 
facility location (FLi) and facility orientation (𝜃𝑖). The model defines facility locations by 
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the placement of their centroids on a user-specified grid system that allows site layout 
planner to select their preferred grid interval. Facility orientation represents the degree 
that a facility is rotated about its centroid and is specified in the present model to be 0 or 
90°, which represents the conventional orientations for rectangular shaped facility 
layouts. Protection strategy decision variables consist of the facility building material 
(Mi), blast wall type (T), and blast wall height (H). 
 
Figure 5.5 Model Decision Variables 
 Objective Function(s) 
The model is designed to generate optimal tradeoffs between the two primary 
objectives of: (1) minimizing the explosive attack consequences (EC) for remote 
construction sites; and (2) minimizing the site construction costs (CC).  
5.3.2.1 Minimizing Site Explosive Attack Consequences  
The first objective function in the present model is designed to calculate and 
minimize the explosive attack consequences (EC) on remote sites, where 0% 
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represents no suffered consequences and 100% represents the highest level of 
consequences (see Eq. (5.15)). In this objective function, an overall EC index is 
calculated to represent the collective performance of the remote site in each of the 
earlier described four consequence types. Due to the various units that are used to 
measure these consequences, they cannot be directly aggregated to evaluate the 
overall level of site consequences. Accordingly, the present model transforms each of 
the aforementioned consequence measurements to an index that ranges from 0% to 
100% by utilizing utility functions with designer-specified utility curve rate parameters. 
The use of utility functions enables designers to: (1) aggregate and standardize the four 
consequence types that have inherently different units of measurements; and (2) 
integrate their individual risk tolerance levels for each of the various consequence types. 
The objective function is then calculated as the weighted sum of the four 
consequence indices. The use of weights provides designers and site layout planners 
with the flexibility to assign higher priority to the consequence types that are most 
critical to the mission and purpose of their remote construction site. Additionally, the 
utility curve rate parameters (rc) provide designers with the flexibility to incorporate their 
own acceptable level of risk tolerance for each consequence type, where: (i) rc <1 
defines a concave curve shape, which represents risk averse designers; (ii) rc =1 
defines a linear function; which represents risk neutral designers, and (iii) rc >1 defines a 
convex function, which represents a risk tolerant design approach (El-Anwar et al. 
2009), as shown in Figure 5.6. The utility functions for the personnel loss index (PLI), 
psychological impact index (PII), economic loss index (ELI), and operational impact 
index (OII) are shown in Eqs. (5.16), (5.17), (5.18) and (5.19), respectively.  
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 min 𝐸𝐶 = 𝑤1×𝑃𝐿𝐼 + 𝑤2×𝑃𝐼𝐼 + 𝑤3×𝐸𝐿𝐼 + 𝑤4×𝑂𝐼𝐼 (5.15) 
 
𝑃𝐿𝐼 = (
𝑃𝐿𝐸𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒
)
𝑟𝑃𝐿
×100% (5.16) 
 
𝑃𝐼𝐼 = (
𝑃𝐼𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒
)
𝑟𝑃𝐼
×100% (5.17) 
 
𝐸𝐿𝐼 = (
𝑇𝐸𝐿𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒
𝑇𝐸𝐿𝑚𝑎𝑥
)
𝑟𝐸𝐿
×100% (5.18) 
 
𝑂𝐼𝐼 = (
𝑇𝑂𝐼𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒
𝑇𝑂𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑥
)
𝑟𝑂𝐼
×100% (5.19) 
where,  
𝐸𝐶 = explosive attack consequences;  
𝑤𝑐 = importance weight for each consequence type, where 𝑤𝑐 > 0 and 
∑ 𝑤𝑐 = 1
4
𝑐=1 ; 
𝑃𝐿𝐼 = personnel loss index score for the site;  
𝑟𝑃𝐿 = personnel loss utility curve rate parameter; 
𝑃𝐼𝐼 = psychological impact index score for the site;  
𝑟𝑃𝐼 = psychological impact utility curve rate parameter;  
𝐸𝐿𝐼 = economic loss index score for the site;  
𝑇𝐸𝐿𝑚𝑎𝑥 = maximum total economic loss for the site ($);  
𝑟𝐸𝐿 = economic loss utility curve rate parameter;  
𝑂𝐼𝐼 = operational impact index score for the site;  
𝑇𝑂𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑥 = maximum total operational impact for the site (days); and 
𝑟𝑂𝐼 = operational impact utility curve rate parameter.  
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Figure 5.6 Calculation Steps of Site Explosive Attack Consequences 
5.3.2.2 Minimizing Site Construction Cost  
The model’s second objective function is designed to calculate and minimize total 
site construction cost (CC), as shown in Eq. (5.20). CC includes the construction cost of 
all site facilities and the perimeter wall, as well as wall replacement costs based on the 
number of times the wall may need to be replaced over the site lifespan. Wall 
replacement costs are necessary for wall types such as sand-filled containers, which 
have a design life of 3-5 years.  
 
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝐶 = ∑(FAi×FCM)
I
i=1
+  PL(WCT,H + 𝐷×𝑅𝑇×WRT,H) 
(5.20) 
where, 
𝐶𝐶 = total site construction cost ($);  
𝑃𝐿 = perimeter wall length (m); 
𝑊𝐶𝑇,𝐻 = wall construction unit cost based on the selected wall type (T) and 
wall height (H) ($/m); 
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𝐷 = discount rate to calculate the present value of future costs (%); 
𝑅𝑇 = number of wall replacements over the site lifespan based on the 
selected wall type (T); 
𝑊𝑅𝑇,𝐻 = wall replacement unit cost based on the selected wall type (T) 
and wall height (H) ($/m); 
𝐹𝐴𝑖 = area of facility i (m
2); and 
𝐹𝐶𝑀 = facility construction unit cost based on the selected building 
material (M) ($/m2). 
 Model Constraints 
The present facility layout optimization model is designed to comply with all 
practical geometric constraints, including: (1) site boundary, which ensures that all 
facilities are constructed within the available site area; (2) facility overlap, which ensures 
that proposed facility locations do not overlap one another; (3) minimum distance, which 
allows designers to establish minimum separation distances between facilities or 
minimum standoff distances from the site perimeter to enforce security and safety 
requirements; and (4) maximum distance, which allow designers to specify the 
maximum distances between facilities, such as locating emergency personnel near the 
fire station or hospital in the event of a rapid-response scenario. Automated 
computational geometry is utilized to analyze each of these geometric constraints and 
to ensure feasible site layout solutions are generated. 
5.4 Model Implementation 
The present model is implemented using multi-objective genetic algorithm (GA) 
to enable the generation of optimal site layout plans that present optimal tradeoffs 
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between minimizing site explosive attack consequences and minimizing site 
construction costs. GA was selected as the optimization algorithm based on its proven 
performance in handling non-linear objective functions and constraints, and successfully 
modeling facility layout and construction optimization problems (Abotaleb et al. 2016; 
Khalafallah and El-Rayes 2011; Said and El-Rayes 2010, 2013; Tong 2016). The model 
utilizes the nondominated sorting genetic algorithm II (NGSA-II) (Deb et al. 2002) and is 
written in Python (Rossum 1995). Model computations are accomplished in three main 
phases: (1) input phase to collect, integrate, and store data for the project site, blast 
wall, facility, and cost, as well as designer-specified importance weights and risk 
tolerance factors and GA search parameters; (2) multi-objective optimization phase that 
initializes the model, evaluates the fitness of generated solutions, selects the fittest 
individuals, generates a new offspring population utilizing the GA search parameters, 
and repeats until the specified number of generations is completed; and (3) output 
phase that facilities the retrieval and visualization of the generated optimal site layout 
plans by producing a database of the generated optimal tradeoff solutions, and 
graphically representing the tradeoff curves of the nondominated Pareto frontier 
solutions.   
5.5 Model Assumptions 
The development of the present model was based on a number of assumptions, 
including: (1) certainty in the specified input data; (2) utilization of single-story 
constructed facilities; (3) explosive attacks detonate near ground level; (4) use of 
conservative design values for facility destruction levels and rates of fatalities, injuries, 
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and post-traumatic stress disorder; and (5) remote construction site populations up to 
250 people.   
5.6 Case Study 
The performance of the developed model is analyzed using a case study that is 
designed to demonstrate the use of the model and display its unique capabilities in 
optimizing remote construction site layouts and generating optimal tradeoffs between 
minimizing site explosive attack consequences and minimizing site construction costs. 
The case study focuses on optimizing the site layout and protection strategies for a 
hypothetical military base that is located in a remote area of an overseas country with a 
construction area cost factor of 1.80 (USACE 2016). The base has an available site 
area of 90 x 60 meters in which to construct the 13 facilities that are required to house 
and support the operations of 110 personnel (see Table 5.3).  
The present model requires site layout planners and designers to specify a 
number of input parameters in order to carry out the optimization computations. Project 
site input data includes an expected site operational lifespan of 20 years and an 
anticipated maximum explosive threat of 454.5 kg, which is the design blast charge 
weight carried in a full-size van (FEMA 2011). Blast wall characteristics include the 
available blast wall types, blast wall heights, and their design lives, as shown in Table 
5.4. Facility characteristics consist of available building materials (see Table 5.5), facility 
dimensions (Lx and Ly) and the assigned facility population (Popi), asset value (FAVi), 
productivity rate (FPRi), and mission dependency index value (MDIi), as shown in Table 
5.3. Cost data is provided for blast walls (Table 5.4) and building materials (Table 5.5). 
A three-meter minimum separation distance between all facilities is also specified. The 
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importance weight (wc) and utility curve rate parameter value (rc) for each consequence 
type are selected based upon the mission and purpose of the remote construction site 
and the risk tolerance levels of site designers. Accordingly, the model enables 
designers to specify these input parameters, which can vary from one decision maker to 
another. For the analysis of this case study, importance weights are set to 0.5, 0.1, 0.1, 
and 0.3, and utility curve rate parameters are set to 0.5, 1.0, 1.0, and 0.75 for personnel 
loss, psychological impact, economic impact and operational impact, respectively. 
These importance weights and utility curve rate parameters reflect that the designers 
place greater emphasis on and are more sensitive to the consequences of personnel 
loss and operational impact. 
Table 5.3 Facility Input Data 
ID Description 
Dimensions 
Assigned 
Population 
(Popi) 
Asset Value 
(FAVi)  
($) 
Productivity 
Rate (FPRi) 
($/month) 
Mission 
Dependency 
Index (MDII) Lx (m)       Ly (m) 
F1-F4 Dormitory (x4) 15 10 12 25,000 1,000 17 
F5 Dining Facility 12 9 20 150,000 50,000 69 
F6 Headquarters 12 9 10 250,000 250,000 81 
F7 Senior Leader Dormitory 15 10 3 50,000 2,500 27 
F8 Storage 8 8 0 10,000 500 5 
F9 Gymnasium 15 10 12 100,000 5,000 51 
F10 Communications Building 8 8 2 375,000 100,000 81 
F11 Maintenance 8 8 3 50,000 25,000 69 
F12 Emergency Response 12 9 5 150,000 50,000 81 
F13 Medical Clinic 16 12 7 200,000 50,000 81 
 
Table 5.4 Blast Wall Input Data 
ID Wall type (WT) 
Wall height  
H (m) 
Construction Costa 
𝑊𝐶𝑇,𝐻 ($/m) 
Replacement Costa 
𝑊𝑅𝑇,𝐻($/m) 
Design Life  
DLT,H (years) 
1 Balsa wood, thick 2 588 881 20 
2 Balsa wood, thick 5 1,467 2,201 20 
3 Balsa wood, thin 2 469 704 20 
4 Balsa wood, thin 5 1,174 1,760 20 
5 CMU 2 472 708 10 
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Table 5.4 (cont.) 
6 CMU 5 1,179 1,769 10 
7 Concrete, thin panel 2 465 698 15 
8 Concrete, thin panel 5 1,161 1,741 15 
9 Polystyrene 2 690 1,035 10 
10 Polystyrene 5 1,722 2,583 10 
11  Polythene sheet 2 605 907 10 
12 Polythene sheet 5 1,512 2,268 10 
13 Revetting material 2 648 972 10 
14 Revetting material 5 1,619 2,428 10 
15 Sand, thick 2 566 849 4 
16 Sand, thick 5 674 1,011 4 
17 Sand, medium 2 366 549 4 
18 Sand, medium 5 494 741 4 
19 Sand, thin 2 288 432 4 
20 Sand, thin 5 416 624 4 
21 Steel 2 1,094 1,642 20 
22  Steel 5 2,736 4,104 20 
23 Water, bag 2 811 1,216 7 
24 Water, bag 5 1,080 1,620 7 
25 Water, filled 2 576 864 7 
26 Water, filled 5 720 1,080 7 
aCosts were determined from the 2017 RS Means, when available, or Army Corps of Engineers subject matter experts 
  
Table 5.5 Building Material Costs 
ID Building Material 
Construction Costa 
𝐹𝐶𝑀 ($/m
2) 
1 Wood frame 3,341 
2 Pre-engineered metal 3,398 
3 Unreinforced masonry 3,557 
4 Steel frame with lightly reinforced CMU infill walls 3,643 
5 Reinforced concrete 3,830 
6 Reinforced concrete with lightly reinforced CMU infill walls 4,738 
aCosts were determined from the 2017 RS Means, when available, or Army Corps of Engineers subject matter experts 
 
The aforementioned input data were utilized by the present model to perform the 
optimization computations for this case study in order to generate optimal site layout 
solutions that provide an optimal tradeoff between minimizing site explosive attack 
consequences and minimizing site construction costs. The multi-objective genetic 
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algorithm (GA) computations are performed in four steps. First, the model randomly 
generates an initial set of solutions that forms the initial population of the first 
generation. This set of solutions represents feasible site layout and protection measure 
decisions. Second, the model evaluates the fitness of each solution and ranks them 
based on nondomination criteria (Deb et al. 2002). Third, the model selects the fittest 
individuals within the population. Fourth, utilizing selection, crossover, and mutation 
operators, the model generates a new offspring population. Steps two through four are 
repeated until the model termination conditions are reached. The optimization GA 
search parameters were established for this case study based on a large number of 
experiments that evaluated a wide range of population sizes, number of generations, 
mutation rates, crossover types, and crossover rates. Accordingly, these GA 
parameters were specified in the present case study to be a population size of 200, 500 
generations, a mutation rate of 0.01, two-point crossover with a crossover rate of 0.75.  
The developed optimization model was used to optimize the selection of facility 
locations and protection strategies to minimize the explosive attack consequences (EC) 
and minimize the construction cost (CC) of the remote construction site. The model 
generated a total of 53 nondominated optimal solutions, where each solution represents 
a unique and optimal tradeoff between the two optimization objectives, as shown in 
Figure 5.7. An analysis of this broad spectrum of generated nondominated solutions 
illustrates that the model was able to identify two extreme nondominated solutions. At 
one of end of the spectrum, solution S1 represents the nondominated solution that 
results in the lowest overall EC (14.8%) at the highest CC ($6.80 million). This minimum 
EC solution was achieved by: (1) constructing a five-meter tall, thick sand blast wall; (2) 
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utilizing the layout shown in Figure 5.7(a); and (3) constructing all facilities using steel 
frame or reinforced concrete with lightly reinforced CMU infill walls, which provide the 
highest levels of blast resistance, as shown in Table 5.6. This solution anticipates 5 
fatality equivalents, 27 personnel to be diagnosed with PTSD, $2.38 million in total 
economic losses, and 4.9 operational days lost. At the other end of the spectrum, 
solution S53 represents the nondominated solution that results in the lowest CC ($5.57 
million) but is expected to suffer the highest EC (54.3%). This lowest cost solution was 
achieved by: (1) constructing a two-meter tall, thick balsa wood blast wall; (2) utilizing 
the layout shown in Figure 5.7(b); and (3) constructing all facilities using wood-frame 
construction, which is the least expensive building material. This design solution 
anticipates individual consequence values of 47 fatality equivalents, 34 personnel to be 
diagnosed with PTSD, $20.1 million in total economic losses, and 21 operational days 
lost, as shown in Table 5.6. 
 
Figure 5.7 Generated Nondominated Solutions 
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Figure 5.8 Site Layout Plan for Solutions (a) S1 and (b) S53 
Between these two extreme solutions, the model generated a wide range of 51 
optimal tradeoff solutions. Designers can analyze the optimal tradeoff solutions and 
select the optimal site layout and protection strategy that best fits the specific 
requirements of their project based on their: (1) maximum acceptable level of explosive 
attack consequences; or (2) maximum available construction budget. For example, 
solution S12 represents the design that has the lowest construction cost ($6.30 million) 
where the anticipated EC does not exceed 20%, as shown in Figure 5.7. This design 
solution anticipates that the site will suffer the following consequences in the event of a 
454.5 kg explosive attack: 11 fatality equivalents, 15 personnel to be diagnosed with 
PTSD, $2.35 million in total economic losses, and 11.5 operational days lost. Table 5.6 
presents a sample of the optimal decision variable selections for the design solutions 
discussed in this section.  
Table 5.6 Sample Nondominated Solutions 
Solution 
Blast 
Wall Building Materials 
EC 
(%) 
SC  
($ M) 
PLEsite 
(people) 
PIsite 
(people) 
TELsite 
($ M) 
TOIsite 
(days) 
S1 16 (6,6,6,6,4,4,4,4,6,4,4,6,4) 14.8 6.80 5 27 2.38 4.9 
S12 21 (4,4,4,4,6,4,2,3,4,5,2,3,4) 19.6 6.30 11 15 2.35 11.5 
S53 1 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1) 54.3 5.57 47 34 20.1 21 
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The results of this case study analysis highlight the significance and practicality 
of the developed optimization model. The model was able to efficiently quantify the 
consequences of an explosive attack in order to generate a broad spectrum of optimal 
site layout solutions and protection strategies that provide optimal tradeoffs between 
minimizing the consequences of explosive attacks and minimizing site construction 
costs. In quantifying the explosive attack consequences, the model was able to: (1) 
compute the number of expected fatality equivalents that accounts for the total number 
of fatalities, serious injuries, and minor injuries resulting from the explosive attack; (2) 
quantify the extent of psychological impacts on survivors of the attack; (3) calculate the 
total economic loss from direct facility and asset damage as well as facility productivity 
losses; and (4) compute the number of operational days lost. These capabilities enable 
designers to select the optimal site layout and protection strategy that best meets the 
mission requirements of their remote construction site.   
5.7 Summary and Conclusions  
This chapter presented the development of a novel multi-objective optimization 
model for the layout and security planning of remote construction sites. The model was 
implemented using multi-objective genetic algorithms to search for and identify solutions 
that provide optimal tradeoffs between the competing objectives of minimizing site 
explosive attack consequences and minimizing site construction costs. The model was 
developed in three main stages that focused on: (1) quantifying the consequences of 
explosive attacks targeting facilities; (2) formulating the model by identifying the relevant 
decision variables, formulating the objective functions, and defining all practical 
constraints; and (3) implementing the model by specifying the input and output data and 
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performing the optimization computations using genetic algorithms. A case study was 
analyzed to demonstrate the use of the model and display its unique capabilities in 
selecting optimal design configurations for a hypothetical 110-person remote military 
base exposed to a 454.5 kg explosive attack. The results of analysis illustrate the new 
capabilities of the model in: (a) efficiently quantifying the consequences of explosive 
attacks on both unprotected and protected facilities; (b) evaluating the impact of serious 
and minor injuries on total personnel losses; (c) quantifying the extent of PTSD among 
survivors of explosive attacks; (d) measuring the total number of days the site is unable 
to perform its primary mission following an explosive attack; and (e) generating optimal 
tradeoffs between the conflicting objectives of minimizing site explosive attack 
consequences and minimizing site construction costs. The developed model should 
prove valuable to site layout planners and designers of remote construction sites in 
high-threat areas, enabling them to search for and select the optimal design 
configuration based on the mission of the remote construction site. This capability will 
result in the construction of cost-effective, secure sites that will reduce the risk of 
personnel loss, psychological impact, economic loss and operational impact in the event 
of an explosive terrorist attack.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 Summary  
The present research study focused on the design and construction decisions of 
remote construction sites in order to minimize the security risks to site personnel and 
facilities from the threat of an explosive attack. The new research developments of this 
study include: (1) an innovative blast effects assessment model; (2) an original facility 
protection optimization model; and (3) a novel blast consequence mitigation model.    
First, an innovative blast effects assessment model was developed enabling 
designers to accurately and efficiently quantify and visualize blast effects on constructed 
facilities behind rigid or frangible blast walls. The model was developed in five main 
stages: (1) blast wall analysis stage that developed a methodology to quantify the 
performance of feasible frangible blast wall types including sand-filled, water-filled, and 
wood walls in reducing reflected pressure and impulse loading on facilities; (2) facility 
damage assessment stage that computed the percent area of each facility within five 
specified damage levels in order to calculate an overall facility damage level; (3) blast 
damage visualization stage that displayed anticipated facility damage areas based upon 
blast charge weight, blast wall type, and building material combinations; (4) 
performance analysis stage that evaluated the accuracy and efficiency of the developed 
model; and (5) case study stage that analyzed the performance of the developed model 
using an application example. The case study analysis demonstrated the model’s 
unique capability to efficiently predict the blast damage level for a constructed facility 
and generate blast damage visualizations for all feasible facility location, blast wall type, 
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and building material design alternatives. This new capability should prove useful for 
designers and construction managers of high-threat sites, allowing them to evaluate 
design options that may not have been previously considered because of the significant 
computational time and effort required by numerical blast assessment models. This 
should also contribute to enhancing the design of remote construction sites in order to 
meet the functional and security requirements established by the site owners. 
Second, an original multi-objective facility protection optimization model was 
developed to optimize the site layout and selection of perimeter blast walls and building 
materials in order to minimize the facility destruction levels from explosive attacks while 
minimizing site construction costs. The model equips planners of remote construction 
sites with the capability to efficiently identify, from a set of feasible alternatives, optimal 
solutions for remote construction sites that minimize the site facility destruction levels 
resulting from explosive attacks in the most cost-effective manner. The model was 
developed in three main stages: (1) formulation stage that defined the relevant decision 
variables, formulated the objective functions, and identified practical model constraints; 
(2) implementation stage that performed the optimization computations using multi-
objective genetic algorithm; and (3) performance evaluation stage that analyzed an 
application example to evaluate and improve model performance. 
Third, a novel multi-objective blast consequence mitigation model was developed 
to optimize the site layout and security planning of remote construction sites in order to 
minimize the consequences of an explosive attack and minimize the construction costs 
of remote sites. The model was developed to support designers in their critical task of 
searching for and identifying optimal remote construction site layouts that minimize the 
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personnel loss, psychological impact, economic loss, and operational impact in the 
event of an explosive attack. The model was developed in three main stages: (1) 
consequence identification stage that quantified the consequences of explosive attacks 
targeting facilities; (2) formulation stage that identified the relevant decision variables, 
formulated the objective functions, and defined all practical constraints; and (3) 
implementation stage that performed the optimization computations using genetic 
algorithm and specified the model input and output data. The performance of the 
developed model was analyzed using a case study that was designed to illustrate the 
use of the model and demonstrate its unique capabilities.  
6.2 Research Contributions  
The main research contributions of this study include the development of: 
1. Novel analytical formulas and effectiveness factors capable of quantifying the 
performance of feasible frangible blast wall types in reducing reflected pressure 
and impulse loading on site facilities from explosive attacks. 
2. Innovative blast effects assessment model (BEAM) capable of efficiently 
quantifying and visualizing blast effects on constructed facilities behind blast 
walls.  
3. Original multi-objective model for optimizing the site layout and selection of 
perimeter blast walls and building materials that provides the unique capability of 
generating optimal tradeoffs between minimizing the destruction of site facilities 
from an explosive attack and minimizing site construction costs.  
4. New metric for evaluating the impact of serious and minor injuries on total 
personnel losses resulting from an explosive attack. 
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5. Novel methodology to quantify the extent of psychological impacts on survivors 
of explosive attacks.  
6. Innovative metric for measuring the impact of explosive attacks on the 
operational capacity of remote construction sites. 
7. Novel blast consequence mitigation model that is capable of identifying optimal 
site layout and protection strategies that minimize the consequences of explosive 
attacks on remote construction sites. 
6.3 Research Impact 
The aforementioned research developments and contributions are expected to 
have significant and broad impacts on the current practices for designing and 
constructing remote construction sites. They have a strong potential to: (1) enhance site 
protection through the use of frangible blast walls that provide comparable and often 
greater reductions in blast loading than rigid walls; (2) minimize facility destruction levels 
in remote construction sites resulting from explosive attacks; and (3) increase overall 
security of remote construction sites by minimizing the personnel losses, psychological 
impacts, economic losses, and operational impacts suffered from an explosive attack. 
6.4 Future Research Work 
While the present study fully achieved its research objectives, additional research 
areas have been identified to expand and build upon the completed research work. 
These future research opportunities include: (1) expanding blast modeling capabilities; 
(2) developing a bilevel optimization model that can consider the competing objectives 
of attackers; and (3) producing a multi-objective sustainability planning model for remote 
construction sites.  
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 Expanding Blast Modeling Capabilities 
The present study considers the most relevant and important design parameters 
and decision variables in quantifying blast effects on constructed facilities behind blast 
walls, including: blast charge weight, blast wall type, blast wall height, building size, 
building material, explosive-to-wall distance, and wall-to-facility distance. The 
methodology developed in the present study yields highly accurate blast analysis 
results, as shown by the performance analysis of the present model compared to the 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Vulnerability Assessment and Protection Option 
(VAPO) software (Schuldt and El-Rayes 2017). The integration of additional decision 
variables and design parameters can expand the use of the model to consider a wider 
range of remote construction sites. These additional modeling considerations may 
include: (1) accounting for uncertainty in model input data; (2) utilizing multi-story 
facilities and various window material and glazing options; and (3) modeling battalion- 
and division-sized camps. 
 Utilizing Bilevel Optimization to Consider Attacker Objectives 
This research study focuses on accurately and efficiently evaluating all feasible 
design alternatives for remote construction sites in order to minimize the security risks 
to site personnel and facilities from the threat of explosive attacks. The optimization 
models developed in this study quantify the consequences of an explosive attack based 
upon the highest level of total facility damage inflicted from 20 possible attack locations. 
Developing a bilevel optimization model would enable decision makers to consider 
competing objectives of intelligent attackers. Bilevel optimization models utilize a leader-
follow scenario or a Stackelberg game (Simaan and Cruz Jr 1973), where designers 
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make construction site layout decisions and the attacker responds by selecting the 
attack location that will maximize his objective. The attacker’s strategies will in turn 
affect the designer’s strategies. This bilevel scenario may result in more resilient remote 
construction site protection strategies.  
 Producing a Sustainability Planning Model for Remote Construction Sites 
Remote construction sites are normally not connected to a local utility grid. This 
lack of established infrastructure creates unique sustainability and environmental 
challenges, including: (1) a heavy reliance on the delivery of resources such as fuel and 
water; and (2) difficulty in treating and disposing of generated wastes. These challenges 
result in several consequences, including: (1) increased energy consumption due to 
generating power on site and transporting fuel and water to the site; (2) higher 
construction and operating costs; (3) deleterious environmental impacts due to 
additional air emissions, natural resource consumption and disposal of generated 
wastes; and (4) adverse impacts on human health due to the level of noise produced by 
generators and harmful emissions from waste incineration. Accordingly, there is a need 
for an innovative multi-objective sustainability planning model for remote construction 
sites that is capable of generating optimal tradeoffs between maximizing site 
sustainability and minimizing construction and operating costs.  
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